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The choice of the "right"  fiscal relationship  Centralizing the fiscal system nevertheless
between central, provincial, and local govem-  reduces the potcntial for vesting more budgetary
ments depends on how a govemment weighs the  decisionmaking powers in iocal govemments
benefits of decentralized economic development  and can crode local and provincial governments'
policies against the costs of having less effective  incentives for raising revenues, another goal of
central fiscal management.  system reform. Moreover, there are major
problems with introducing fiscal centralization in
Three strong forces justify more fiscal  a country with a heterogeneous population of I
centralization in China's highly decentralized  billion and relatively little tnidition of central
fiscal system at the present time:  govemment fiscal administration.
* Bouts of inflation and recurrent fiscal  Bahl and Wallich conclude that a reformed
deficits can be seen as calling for more central  system ol intergovernmental finance must meet
control over the budget.  the  center's necds for stabilization and the
provinces'  necds lbr revenue and equalized
- Reform of an economic system relies  spending capacity. They argue that such equal-
heavily on the use of tax policy as an allocative  ization should be based on objective indicators
instrument to influence economic decisions.  of need and that a formula-based grant system
Local control of the implementation of the tax  best meets this latter objectivc. A rcformed
system can and probably has compromised some  system must also underpin price and enterprise
objectives of the central government's tax  reform - and should be designed so as not to
policy. Gaining tighter control over the revenue  require major rccalibration or adjustments while
system will probably require reducing if not  such rcforms are taking place.
eliminating local govemment discretion in
providing special tax concessions.  Bahl and Wallich also conclude that reformn
of the rclationishlip  of central and local govem-
* If the center wants to movc ahead with price  ments should be supplemcnted by an improved
reform and to encourage entcrprise reform, it  system of Financing local capital expenditures
needs a more centrally controlled revenuc  through borrowing, a system of benefit charges,
sharing or assignment system that reduces the  and improved financial planning and tax admin-
dislocating effects of such reforms.  istration.
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1.  The purpoee of this paper is to analyze options for reform to the system
of subnational finance in China--the central-local revenue-sharing system--
with a focus, inter alia, on the support to system reform, macrostabilization,
equalization and allocative effects.
2.  Both the government and outside observers have come to realize that
China's system of public financing requireo change in order to better support
the system reform.  Under the previous system of strict central planning, the
objectives of fiscal policy were limited:  its allocative function was to
administratively redistribute resources--derived mostly from enterprise
surpluses--through the budget to enterprises and government units; its role in
stabilization consisted mostly of expenditure or investment cutbacks to reduce
aggregate demand pressures.  Under the system reform, tax policy plays a role
in both mobilizing resources for government spending purposes and for
indirectly controlling the economic decisions of enterprises.l/
3.  Matters such as central government tax reform are usually a concern of
the national treasury.  This is not the case in China.  Perhaps more than in
any other country in the world, China's national tax structure and system of
intergovernmental fiscal relations are linked.  The success of any central
government tax reform will be determined by the policy reactions of local
governments, and by local implementation of central policy.  While uniform
national tax laws are laid down in Beijing, subnational governments are
responsible for tax administration, share in revenue collections, and may make
policy by giving tax incentives to enterprises.
4.  By the same token, any reforri  in the system of intergovernmental
relations must be evaluated in a context of the objectives of the system
reform.  Enterprise and price reforms affect the tax base available for
sharing in each province, revenues mobilized for each level of government must
reach some prescribed target, and fiscal disparities among provinces must stay
within some prescribed range.  Finally, and underneath much of the clamor for
a reform of the intergovernmental system, is to move government fiscal
decisions "closer to the people."  There is no question but that this goal of
the systen,  reform argues for a stronger local government sector.
S.  The choice  the "right" central-local fiscal relationship will depend
on how the govf  .. ient  weighs the benefits of decentralized economic develop-
ment policies a  ainst the costs of having less effective central fiscal
management.  There are three strong forces justifying more fiscal
centralization in China at the present time: (a) inflation and recurrent
deficits are interpreted by some government policymakers as calling for more
central control over the budget; (b) if the center wants to move quickly with
price reforms and to encourage enterprise reform, it will need a centrally
controlled revenue system which reduces the dislocating effects; (c) the
economic svstem reform relies heavily on the use of tax policy as an
allocative instrument to influence economic decisions, and local control over
the implementation of the tax system can (and probably has) compromised some
of the objectives of central government tax policy.  In order to gain tighter
control over the revenue system, it will be necessary to reduce if not
eliminate local government discretion in providing special tax concessions.
To centralize the fiscal system, however, sacrifices possibilities of vestilug
1/  See Revenue Mobilization and Tax Policy, World Bank Red Cover Report,
1989, for a fuller treatment of tax reforms in China, and Finance and
Investment, World Bank, Red Cover Report, 1988, for a description of
China's fiscal system in the 1979-83 period.more budgetary decision-making powers in local governments and can erode the
revenue-raising incentives of provincial and local governments, which are also
goals of system reform.  Moreover, there are major problems with £ntroducing
fiscal centralization in a cous;try  with a heterogeneous population of one
billion and relatively little tradition of central government fiscal
administration.
6.  This research is addressed to the question of fiscal decentralization in
China, with a view to better understanding its present features, their
consequences and possible reform options.  The paper has three parts.  The
first outlines the present system of subnational finance in Chir.A;  the second
describes the impacts of this system on resource allocation and income
distribution; and the third develops options and recommendations for reform.
China plans such a reform following the ninth Plan period.  As necessary
background, the following paragraphs briefly review recent fiscal developments
and the tax structure in China.
China's Fiscal Reforms and Revenue Trends
7.  Fiscal policy in China has evolved in the context of overall system
reforms undertaken since 1979.  These emphasized decentralization of economic
management, with greater autonomy given to provinces and state enterprises,
and allowed the development )f  the non-state sector.  Associated reforms were
initiated in prices, the financial sector, and the foreign trade and payments
system.  Corresponding to the priorities implicit in enterprise and price
reform, fiscal reforms focused on three main areas: (i) the reform of direct
(enterprise)  taxation; (ii) the reform of indirect taxes; and (iii) reform of
the system of center-local fiscal relations.
8.  Under the reforms of direct taxes, full profit remittance was replaced by
a  "profits tax," with enterprises allowed to retain a portion of their
profits.  The objective was to provide enterprises with incentives.  Profit
taxation was introduced in 1984 first as a flat rate tax (55  percent),
supplemented by an "adjustment tax" designed to compensate for the impact on
profitability of factors external to the enterprise, such as administered
prices and distorted costs.  Tax rates, therefore, varied significantly
between enterprises, and gave rise to significant lack of uniformity when com-
pared to tax systems in market economies.
9.  The discretionary element soon took on increased importance under the
"responsibility system," in which enterprises' tax liability was negotiated on
a case-by-case basis through a "contract" designed to stimulate enterprise
production and investment.  Contracts called for a tax quota to be paid, with
any profits above the quota amount taxed at a lower (sometimes zero) rate.
Thus, as output and profits expand, the effective tax rate falls, and enter-
prises retain a larger share of total profits earned.  At end-1989, some
90 percent of state-owned enterprises were subject to contracting, according
to the Chinese Ministry of Finance sources.  Since the introduction of
contracting, the elasticity of enterprise income taxes has been below unity
and the overall tax-GDP ratio has fallen.  In the longer run, however, this
practice may expand the tax base and tax receipts if it is successful in
promoting growth and efficiency.
10.  Contracts designed with the low marginal tax rate also introduce a strong
procyclical aggregate demand element into tax policy.  As production, profits
and the economy grow, relatively more resources are kept by the enterprises
which further increase demand.  (These  demand pressures exist whether the
profits are reinvested or paid out as wages.)  In contrast with other
countries where the tax system is structured so as to restrain aggregate
demand when the economy grows excessively rapidly, the stabilization effects
of contracting in China could be said to be perverse.  This  would be less ser-
ious if the authorities had other effective macroeconomic instruments to con--3-
trol aggregate demand.  The contracting system in its widely applied contract
management responsibility system (CMRS)  version has also reduced the central
government's flexibility to introduce new direct tax policies in a timely
manner.  This occurs because tax contracts--fixed for us to five years--aet a
nominal revenue level.  Even if the contract itself were fixed for a shorter
period (this could be undesirable in that it would increase uncertainty for
enterprises), the fact is that most contracts are negotiated by the provincial
and local governments which have no  macroeconomic responsibilities, and which
therefore pursue developmental, not stabilization, objectives.
11.  Indirect tax reforms have increasingly replaced a cascading sales tax
(product  tax) with a VAT accompanied by excises and a gross receipts tax on
businesses (business  tax).  The restructuring of taxes on production was a
necessary consequence of the elimination of profit remittance.  Under profit
remittance, the fact that prices did not reflect costs of production was not
very important.  However, under profit taxation, since enterprises kept a
certain proportion of their profits, and the pricing system generated consid-
erable profit differentials between enterprises, this had consequences for
their investment and growth prospects.  This inequality could have been
reduced by price reform, but instead differential product taxes were used to
offset the inequities arising from distorted prices.  As 'he price of a good
to its purchaser was fixed, an indirect tax could be used to reduce the 'orice
received by the producer and thus reduce excess profits.  The main
consideration in setting product tax rates in 1984 was to equalize profits (as
a proportion of sales value) between products, with some modifications to
encourage or discourage the production of particular goods.  This approach led
to a very large (over  260) number of different indirect tax rates.  Ir.  China,
therefore, indirect taxes also carry a discretionary element, since they are
used to equalize intersectoral profitability.
12.  Central-local fiscal relations also underwent major reform, pari passu
with the regional decentralization which has been such an i  .portant  aspect of
overall reform.  In China, local governments are responsible for collecting
virtually all major taxes, with revenues "shared upward" to central
government.  The sharing proportions differ between provinces based on the
outcomes of their negotiations with the central government.  Over time the
trend has been to allow provinces a larger share of the revenues they collect.
The system in place from 1981-86 required a percentage (which  differed by tax)
of each tax to be shared with the center.  More recently, contracts have been
introduced which call for provinces to deliver a "tax quota" to the central
government and allow above-quota collections to be retained at a higher rate,
or fully retained.
13.  These fiscal reforms have, in fact, had a major impact on revenue
structure and trends.  Direct taxes make up some 19 percent of total revenues
(and 3.7 percent of GDP) while indirect taxes comprise 4S percent, or 9.3
percent of GDP.  (Other tax and non-tax revenues, including trade taxes
contribute 35 percent of the total--7 percent of GNP.)  A notable result of
the tax reforms and the decentralization of the fiscal regime has been the
decline, continuous since the beginning of the reforms in 1979, in the ratio
of total revenue in relation to GNP, from 34 percent in 1978 and 32 percent in
1979 to about 19.8 percent in 1989 (see  Table 1).  To some extent, this has
been the intended consequence of policies to increase enterprise profit
retention and enhance provincial autonomy.  However, the declining trend also
reflects the unintended consequences of the design of the reforms themselves,
and the system of both provincial and enterprise contracting.4
Table  I  CHINA:  DEVELOPMENTS  IN  GOVERNMENT  REVENUE  - CONSOLIDATED  GOVERNMENT
1978-89  a/
(In  %  of  GOP)
1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  19'89
Total  revenue  31.6  29.4  29.0  27.2  27.4  26.4  26.3  24.8  22.2  20.4  19.8
Direct  Taxes  d/  18.4  16.9  16.2  13.9  12.9  11.6  8.1  7.1  5.9  4.9  3.7
Profit  tax  (1.1)  (1.0) (0.9)  (0.9)  (1.0)  (1.3) (7.6) (6.7)  (5.0) (4.5)  (3.4)
Profit  Remittance  (17.2) (15.9)  (15.1) (12.9)  (11.5)  (9.9) (0.5) (0.4)  (0.4) (0.4)  (0.3)
Indirect  Taxes  11.4  10.8  10.9  11.1  10.2  10.1  11.2  10.8  9.6  9.2  9.2
Product tax  (0.0)  (0.0)  (0.0)  (0.0)  (0.0)  (0.0)  (6.9)  (5.6)  (4.7)  (3.5)  (3.3)
VAT  (0.0)  (0.0)  (0.0)  (0.0)  (0.0)  (0.0)  (1.7)  (2.4)  (2.2)  (2.8)  (2.7,
Business tax  (0.0)  (0.0)  (0.0)  (0.0)  (0.0)  (0.0)  (2.5)  (2.7)  (2.?)  (2.9)  (3.1)
AgricuLturat  taS  (0.3)  (0.2)  (0.2)  (0.2)  (0.2)  (0.1)  (0.1)  (0.1)  (0.0)  (0.1)  (0.1)
Taxes on int.  traie  0.7  0.8  1.1  0.9  0.9  1.5  2.4  1.6  1.3  1.1  1.2
Other taxes  b/  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.5  2.4  2.0  3.4  3.3  3.2  3.1  3.3
Nontax  revenue  0.9  0.8  0.7  0.8  1.0  1.1  1.1  2.0  2.2  2.1  2.5
Memo  items:
Extrabud.  receipts:
- of  government  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.6  1.8  1.7  1.6  1.5  1.3  1.3
- of  pubtic  agencies S/  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.3  0.2  0.3  0.2  0.2
Source:  Ministry  of  Finance.  (Note:  Adjusted  according  to  the  IMF's  Govermrent  Finance  Statistics  (GFS)  format,
which  differs  from  Chinese  budget).
aJ ConsoLidated  central,  provincial  anm  tocal  govermnents
b/ Includes  taxes  on  extrabudgetary  receipts,  on  extrabudgetary  construction,  and  wage  bonus  tax.
p/  Excludes  enterprise  retained  earnings  and  depreciation  funds.
d/ Includes  profit  remittance  1978-84.
A.  THE-PRESENT  SYSTEM  OF SUBNATIONAL  FINANCE  IN CHIN
14.  Despite its size and  diversity, China has chosen a unitary system 'f
government in which the Constitution does not expressly delineate the powers
and responsibilities of the various levels of government.  Yet the central,
provincial and local levels of government have distinct powers and
responsibilities, and in many respects the Chinese system functions as a
federalism.  Fiscal behavior varies enough across provinces to contravene
national uniformity in China.
15.  China's system of  intergovernmental transfers is an important component
of tota'.  public financing, perhaps more so than in any other country.  China's
shared tax system based on sales and profits taxes makes local government
revenue in principle responsive to growth in income and prices.  The
distribution of tax shares among provinces is changing from a broad formula-
based approach with an equalizing intent to an ad hoc approach charactsrized
in recent years by substantial negotiation and a variety of special purpose
discretionary grants.  The Chinese system does not make wide use of
categorical or cost reimbursement grants to stimulate spending for particular
purposes, nor does it use formula-based grants formula-based grants which take
account of the population characteristics of provinces.-5-
Provincial Government Finances
16.  In the Chinese system, the central Syvernment has direct relationa with
provincial governments.  This system is rzughly described in Chart 1.  All
governnments  within a province report direv.tly  (or indirectly) to the
provincial government, and carry out their duties subject to provincial
zegulations.  This  system of vertical relationships creates a setting within
the province which in principle would allow a very substantial degree of
fiscal decentralization to the local government level.  For example, in
Zhejiang Province at the end of 1985, there were 8 provincial cities
(municipalities), 66 counties, 3 country-level cities, 3 prefectures and 508
towns.
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La  Indicates administrative, not governmental, status.
17.  In some ways, the Chinese fiscal system is as decentralized as its gov-
ernmental structure.  Municipal and county governments' tax bureaus directly
assess and collect about 65% of all taxes.  Expenditure responsibility is less
decentralized in that provincial and local governments account, on average,
for over 60% of total direct expenditures.  Only a few countries in the world
can claim as great a degree of expenditure or revenue decentralization and
none can claim this degree of decentralization in tax administration.2/
2/  The comparable ratios for the United States--which is a decentralized
fiscal system by world standards--are 43% of taxes collected and 42% of
expenditures made by state and local governments.  The ratio of subnatio-
nal to central government expenditure exceeds 75% in Denmark, Australia,
Switzerland, Ital  and Canada, but subnational government revenue autono-
my is more limited.  Roy Bahl, "The Design of Intergovernmental Transfers
in Industrialized Countries," Public Budgeting and Finance, Winter 1986,-6-
Table 2  shows recent trends in the share in revenues and expenditures of
central ar.d  subnational governments.
18.  The central government speiads  more than it collects.  Central government
expenditures, until recently, amounted to half or more of total gavernment
outlays (seq Table 2).  The central government'a major areas of expenditure
reuponnibility are defense, foreign affai.rs  and foreign aid, national
universities and research, central ministries, general administration, and
large investment pLojects.  In addition, the central government provides net
revenue transfers to poor provinces.
Table  2. TAX  COLLECTION  AND  EXPENDITURE  OF  CENTRAL  AND  LOCAL  GOVERNMENTS,  1980-89
Revenue
Unified  system  Sharing  Contracting
1980  1981  1982  1983  19i  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
Total  revenues  100o,:  100.0 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
X  center  19.3  20.6  22.9  29.7  34.9  37.0  39.3  35.3  36.4  37.5
X tocal  80.7  79.4  77.1  70.2  65.0  62.9  60.7  64.7  63.6  63.5
Total  expenditures  100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0  100.0
X  center  53.6  54.0  49.9  50.0  47.5  44.0  41.2  39.5  35.9  n.a.
% local  46.3  46.0  50  1  50.0  52.5  56.0  58.7  60.5  64.1  n.a.
Ratio  of  Cuttection  to  GNP  25.0  22.6  21.6  21.4  21.4  21.7  23.1  20.1  18.9  18.1
Subnational  19.4  18.0  16.6  15.1  14.0  13.?  13.8  13.4  12.0  11.3
Central  4.6  4.6  5.0  6.3  7.4  8.0  9.3  7.3  6.7  (6.8)
Ratio  of  Expenditures  to  GNP  27.9  23.1  22.1  22.4  22.7  22.4  23.8  23.3  18.7  16.4
Subnational  14.9  12.4  11.5  11.2  11.9  12.5  139  12.9  12.0  n.a.
Central  12.9  10.6  11.4  11.2  10.7  9.8  9.8  8.4  6.7  n.a.
Central  Goverrment  Share of:
Collectiors  19.3  20.6  23.0  29.8  34.9  37.0  39.3  35.3  36.1  37.5
Expenditures  53.6  54.0  49.9  49.6  47.8  43.3  41.3  39.5  35.9  n.a.
Expenditure-Collection  Ratio
Center  309.5 267.6  222.8  172.5  141.0  115.7 104.9  115.0  99.5  n.a.
Subnational  64.9  50 3  66.7  74.1  82.7  88.9  101.8  96.1  99.6  n.a.
Sources:  See  Table  5.
Notes:  On  Chinese  definition  of  revenues  and  expenditures,  which  do  not  correspond  to  GFS  format  data  reported
elsewhere  in  this  report  and  in  tables  focusing  on  national  level  taxes.
19.  The responsibilities of the provincial and lower-level authorities
include their own investment projects, and most, but not all, public
expenditures on education and health, local administration (and tax
collection), culture, science and agricultural support, including irrigation,
agricultufal research, extension activities  and other rural expenditures.
Since the inception of the economic reforms, there has been a gradual trend
towards decentralizing expenditures, with the central government's share in
total outlays decliniiig  and a corresponding increase in the expenditure share
of local governments.  Consequently the center's share of total expenditures
has bren declining over the decade from about 53% of tota. expenditures to 35%
Volume 6, Number 4, pp. 3-22.(Table 2).  Little is known, however, about the types of expdnditure shifts
which have taken place.
20.  Decrees of Autonomy:  Revenues.  Revenue collection and exper.diture
disbursement are not the only dimensions of fiscal decentralizatior,  and on'i
can find many areao where fiscal decisions are subject to substantial central
control and direction.  By comparison with most count-'es in the world,
subnat4onal governments in China have little formal, or legal independence in
matters of structuring thei.r  tax system or deciding on the level and
composition of expenditures.  All tax rates and bases are set centrally and so
there are no truly local taxes--defined as thosa whose rate or base the
subnational govarnment can unilaterally fix--at the subnational level.3/
Moreover, the central government determires, for each province, a share of
taxes to be t  ned over to the center.  In effect, subnational tax collections
in China are central government:  taxes whose revenues are allocated among
provinces, municipalities and the central government.
21.  Even with this degree of centralization in the rules, however,
subnationial  governmentn have ani  i 4niportant  impact on spending levels and on the
amount of revenues raised within their provincial jurisdiction.  This follows
because provinces design and implement the system of intergovernmental
relations between the province and local governments.  In particular,
provinces determine the share of tax collections that will be retained by each
local government.  The allocation of loans to local enterprises and the
distribution of grants to local governments are also determined by the
provincial government.  Moreover, because provinces can set the tax shar ng
rates for each local government, they may also indirectly affect the rela_ive
rate of tax collection or tax effort the local administration makes.  Local
governments have a substantial degree of autonomy to affect the level and
composition of taxation, rablic service delivery and capital investment.  This
autonomy arises from the fact that they control tax collection and assessment
with apparently a minimum of direct central or even provincial supervision.
Local governments also have a subBtantial degree of freedom in awarding tax
contracts to their enterpr.ins.  Responsibility for implementation of the tax
system is a very powerful p-iicy instrument in the hands of local government
and indications are that they use it.
22.  Expenditure Autonomy.  Autonomy on the expeneiture side of the budget is
limited for provinces.  Subnational government budgets are determined as part
of a consolidated central, provincial and local budget and as such must
satisfy the (negotiated) fiscal targets laid down by higher level government.
The budgetary choices of provincial governments are further limited by
expenditure rules, mandates and monitoring by higher level government.
23.  Within the province, there is more room for discretion.  At the local
level, provincial governments are responsible for approving the budgets and
financial plans of municipal and county governments.  This means they can
control the spatial distribution of expenditures within the prqvince.  There
appears to be great variation in the system of province-local :elations across
provinces, suggesting the provincial governments have significant room to
adjust fiscal decisions to accommodate local needs and preferences within the
parameter'  set  by the central goveriiment.
24.  Within the system of "vertical" responsibility, each province must
account to the central government for its activities.  In this process of
vertical accountability, the following principles restrain, or guide,
budgetary choices of provincial governments:  a) there cannot be a deficit;
3/i  Local oovernments are entitled to set surtax rates on a small number of
taxes.  Local governments also collect a set of extrabudgetary fees a.ad
charges.-8-
(b) current expenditures to maintain infrastructure have the highest priority
among urban construction-relaLed expenditures; (c)  the provision of social
everhead facilities such as education, scientific research institutes and
hospitals take a high priority; expenditures on culture and education are
mandated to increase by at least the same rate as tota; oxpenditures; (d)
employment levels and wage rates are fixed by the central and provincial
governments; (e) all revenues from the urban maintenance and construction tax
must be spent for urban maintenance and construction, i.e., for public
utilities %nd public facilities.
Budoetina and Financial Plannjfg
25.  In theory, China has a unified system of budgeting--covering all
accounts--in which all the financial plans and accounts of the central and
subnational governments are j3intly presented.4;  Eaclh  provincial government
in principle also has a  consolidated budget which includes the budgets of all
lower level local governments.  However, in the provinces visited for this
work, the budgets were neit}her  fully unified nor fully consolidated.5/
26.  Because government budgets do not fully include all revenue and
expenditure accounts, it is difficult to construct an estimate of the total
amount of revenues raised or expenditures made by the subnational governments
in particular local areas.  For example, extrabudgetary revenues and nonplan
expenditures are reported in the budget, along with budgetary receipts and
outlays.  However, departmental revenues and grants received are generally not
reported in the accounts.  Tl.e  tranpfers between, and overlaps among, the
budgets of the general government, the SOEs and public utilities are not
apparent.  The example of transfers from the general government to the SOEs
can illustrate the nature of the problem.  The provincial government budget
shows transfers to SOEs under the "technical transformation" heading, but it
does not distinguish between grants and loans.  Other Lransfere to cover SOE
losses are shown as an expenditure in the general provincial budget and not as
a  transfer, unless the loss is "unplanned," in which  case it is shown as
negative profits' tax revenue (i.e., it is subtracted from revenues--not added
to  expenditures).  A  further complication is that grants to provincial and
local governments do not appear to be shown separately in the budget
27.  With regard to the distinction made in some countries between capital and
current budgets, each local (urban)  government has a regular budget and a
construction budget, but these do not correspond to a division of current and
capital expenditures, and there is no separate reporting of capital financing.
There does not appear to be an operative concept of capital budgeting.
Tax Administration
28.  Provincial and city governments cannot vary the nominal rates of tax, nor
may they redefine the leqal tax base.  However, they have almost complete
autonomy in assessing and collecting taxes, and along w.th the lower level
county government can and do give tax relief without having to seek approval
from the Center.  One could fairly say that subnational governments can
substantially alter the level and pattern of effective tax rates paid by
enterprises.
4/  "Unified" budgeting is used here to mean a budget which incorporates all
accounts of any particular government unit.  "Consolidated" uses the
Chinese terminology and reflects the joint presentation of the budget of
all levels of government.
5/  The provinces were Anhui, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shandong, Shanghai and
Beijing (which have the status of a province).-9-
29.  The organization of tax administration in China centers around the
activities of two organizations:  the Tay Bureau and the Finance Department.
There are separate Tax Bureaus and Finance Departments at the city, county and
province levels.  The functions of the Tax Bureau and the Finance Department
seem clearly distinguishable in principle.  The Finance Department conducts
tax policy allowed by law at the provincial and local levels, and manages the
expenditure side of the budget.  The Tax Bureau is responsible for
implementing central tax law and collecting taxes.  In theory, both are Et the
same time organs of the central and local governments.  In practice, the
division of responsibility is not so clear, and the directives given to the
Tax Bureau by the central government and ito subnational government are not
always consistent.  Many of the Tax Bureaus' actions in the provinces visited
for this work suggest substantial tension as a result of this system of "dual
leadership."  The assessment based on this field work is that the tax and
finance bureaus are more likely to act as agents of the provincial or local
governments than of the central government.  The Finance Department plays the
dominant policy leadership role within the provincial and local governments.
30.  Provincial and local goxernments have a surprising amount of discretion
in granting tax relief.  Their activities in this regard are referred to as
the policy of "stimulating enterprises through tax expenditures."  Three
types of tax Bxperliture, or methods of granting preferential tax treatments,
are used.  First, if the provincial government wants to promote a new product
or a pioneer industry, it may authorize a reduced tax rate or a tax holiday
for a number of years (usually not to exceed five years).  Second, the Finance
Bureau may enter into a contract arrangement with an enterprise for payment of
a  negotiated (as distinct from schedular) amount of taxes.  Third, the Tax
Bureau may grant ad hoc tax relief to enterprises on a case-by-case basis
depending on the needs of the enterprise.  There is every indication that
provincial and local governments use this discretion to promote economic
development in the local area, even though the preferences granted sometimes
do not conform with the objectives of the central government and may seriously
Impair its revenue position.
Provincial and Local Revenues
31.  Provincial governments have four revenue sources:  own taxes and shared
taxes; extrabudgetary funds; user fees; and capital grants.  China's revenue
sharing system is primarily a division of sales anc profit taxes among the
central, provincial, and local governments.  Whereas in most countries the
taxes are collected by the central government and then allocated to the lower
level subnational governments, in China they are collected by the local
governm'.nts  and "shared-up" to the higher levels.  The amount of  shared tax
revenue finally ending up at each level of government depends on the tax base
and rate, tax administration, the sharing formulae between the province and
its municipalities, and the sharing formula between center and province.  To
understand the revenue-sharing system in China, one must understand all of
these dimensions.
32.  Tax Revenues.  By law, there are three categories of revenues--"fixed
central government revenues," "fixed local government revenues," and "shared
revenues."  Box 1 shows the principal taxes in each of these categories prior
to the 1988 proposed changes.  In all three cases, however, rate determination
and base definition are not under local control.  Revenues collected from
local taxes are, in principle, assigned fully to the local government and are
referred to as "local fixed revenues."  The actual practice of revenue sharing
in China has not matched this scheme.  Most "local fixed" and "shared" taxes
have neen subject to sharing, apparently because adherence to these categories
caused a revenue shortfall to the central government.  Since 1988, other minor
changes have taken place in the allocation of these taxes to different levels- 10  -
Box 1:  PRINCIPLES  OF  REVENUE  ALLOCATION  AND  TAX  SHARING
1985 REFORMS
1.  "Fixed  Central  Goverrnment  Revenues":
1.  Income  and adjustment tax  of  all  central  goverrinent enterprises.
2.  Business tax from railroads,  bank and insurance conpany headquarters.
3.  Profit  remittances  by atl  enterprises  producing arms.
4.  Price  subsidies  paid  to  producers of  grain,  cotton  and  oiL  (treated  as a negative  revenue of
the  central  goverrment).
5.  Fuel oil  special  tax.
6.  Income  taxes,  sales  taxes  and royalties  from offshore  oil  activities  of  foreign  companies
and joint  ventures.
7.  Treasury bond income.
8.  70X of  the  three  sales  taxes  collected  from enterprises  owned  by the  Ministry  of  Industry,
the linistry  of  Power, SINOPEC,  and the  China Nonferrous Metals  Company.
9.  All  customs  duty  and all  VAT  and product  taxes collected  at  customs.
10.  Tobacco  Tax and Business Tax on Tobacco.
II.  Product tax  on Liquor and tobacco.
II.  In  1985-87. the  "local  fixed  revenues" were as follows:
1.  Income  tax  and adjustment tax  of  locally-owned  enterprises.
2.  Income  tax  from coltectively  owned  enterprises  (ICIT).
- AgricuLture  tax.
Rural  market trading  tax  levied  on private  sector  traders.
5.  Local goverrament  grain  trading  Loss (a  negative  tax).
6.  Fines for  delinquent  taxes.
7.  The Urban Maintenance  and  Construction  Tax (UMCT).1/
8.  Housing tax.g/
9.  Vehicle  utilization  tax.
10.  30X of  the  sales  tax  reveiiue collected  from enterprises  owned  by the  Ministry  of  Power,
SINOPEC,  and the  China Nonferrous Met..s  Conpany.
11.  Individual  income tax.
12.  Wage  bonus tax.
13.  Self-empLoyed  Entrepreneurs Tax
14.  Slaughter  Tax.
15.  CattLe Trading Tax.
16.  Contract  Tax.
III.  Taxes  shared between the  central  and local  governments:
1.  All  sales  taxes  (valued-added, business,  and product)  revenues from all  enterprises,  except
those expressly  excluded as described above under 1:6,  9 and 10.
2.  Natural  resource taxes.
3.  Construction  tax.
4.  Salt  tax.
5.  Industrial  and commercial tax,  and income tax,  Levied on foreign  and joint  venture
enterprises.
6.  Energy and transportation  fund  tax.
I/  The Urban Maintenance  and Construction  Tax (UMCT)  is  set  at  7%  of  total  sales  tax  Liability  for
for  municipaLities  (5% for  towns and 1%  everywhere  elsel.
of  government.  More  generally,  as  central  revenue  needs  grow,  the  shift  of
new  taxes  into  the  "central  fixed"  category  is  made.
33.  Extrabudoetary  Funds.  other  sources of  revenue  for  provincial  and  local
governments,  earmarked  for  capital  purposes,  are  extrabudgetary  funds.  The
amount  of  revenue  involved  is  relatively  small  compared  to  other  provincial
and  local  revenue  sources,  and  accounts  for  only  3% of  total  extrabudgetary
funds  (enterprise  retained  earnings  are  about  80% and  extrabudgetary  revenues
of  government  agencies  are  about  17%)  and  less  than  1.6%  of  government
budgetary  revenue.- 11 -
34.  User Charges.  Though the public utility enterprises attempt to recoup a
portion of costs through user charges, there has been no strong sentiment to
raise rates to efficient (marginal  cost) levels.  In China, cost recovery is a
much bigger matter than simply raising the level of the user ch>-ge.  Water,
sewerage and gas (LPG)  charges, bus fares and housing cannot be adjusted
independent of national wage and price policy and enterprise and tax reform
policy.  Perhaps as important, but less widely recognized, is the relationship
between increasing the rate of user charge and the sharing of revenues among
the three levels of government.  An increased user charge--paid by enterprises
or by individuals and compensated by an increase in wages--will lower profits
and therefore the tax liability of enterprises.  The result will be a shift in
revenue power (a) from the central to the local level because the whole of the
user charge "stays at home," and (b) from the general government to the public
utility enterprises.  Unfortunately, no data are available for making a good
estimate of the percentage of total costs recouped by user charges, but it is
probably quite low.  Residential user charges have changed little since
Liberation, though there has been some increase in the rates charged to
enterprises.  Within limits set by the central government, local governments
can increase user fees, and have done so for commercial and industrial users.
35.  Capital Grants and Borrowing.  China has no regular, formula grant
program to support capital projects; all grants are on an ad hoc basis.  There
is no mechanism or formal program for lending to local governments, and there
is no formal mechanism that guides local governments in developing beneficiary
financing schemes.  Capital financing is done from some combination of current
revenues, planned loans or grants, special exceptions to the restrictions on
borrowing, and creative, ad hoc approaches to benefit financing.
36.  Provincial and local governments in China cannot borrow.  However, there
appear to be ways to avoid these restrictions.  Short-term borrowing (less
than one year) and even some longer term credit financing does occur.  In some
cases, municipally owned enterprises borrow for infrastructure projects and in
some cases the municipal government has pledged its general revenues to secure
loans to its enterprises.  Nevertheless, credit financing is quite limited.
As a result, the "price" of capital construction is high because it must be
financed from current revenues rather than loans, i.e., by current rather than
future beneficiaries and by the general public rather than by direct
beneficiaries.
Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations
37.  There are three important dimensions to the system of intergovernmental
fiscal relations in China.  the first is the system of tax sharing, outlined
above, which determines the amount of resources that will be allocated to the
subnational government sector.  The second is the distribution of these funds
among provinces, and includes both the tax sharing formulae and the flow of
grants and subsidies.  The third is the system of horizontal fiscal relations
within the province, the method by which the provinci&l government allocates
fiscal resources among its counties and municipalitiea.
38.  Central-Provincial Transfers.  The central government determines the tax
sharing arrangements with the provinces.  The system in China is essentially a
sharing of revenues from a specitied set of taxes (Box 1), almost all of which
are central government taxes that are collected by the local governments.  The
total size of the distributable pool is thus determined primarily by the
amounts collected.  The distribution of central revenues by province is then
determined by a combination of (a)  origin of collections, (b) formula, and (c)
negotiation and ad hoc decisions.  The exact sharing rate, which are in the- 12 -
last analysis the result of a central-provincial negotiation, are presented in
Table 3.6/
39.  The basic ehring  formula, first applied in 1985, and t..Jified  later to




where Ratio =  The share of collections to be retained by the province
E(83) =  Actual amount of "Allowable" local government
expenditures in 1983
R(83) =  Actual amount of local fixed plus shared revenues
collected in 1983
40.  The results of applying this procedure are described in Table 3a for the
1985-87 period and in Table 3b for 1988-90.  For example, allowable
expenditures in Beijing were equivalent to 48.2% of total shared and local
fixed revenues in 1985, hence Beijing in 1985 would be able to retain 48.2% of
all it collected from those two categories of tax.  Of course, all fixed
central government revenues would have to be turned over to the center.  As
may be seen from Table 3a, 15 provinces were in such a surplus position in
1985, i.e., shared plus local fixed revenues exceeded allowable expenditures
and the tax sharing ratio was less than unity.
41.  The remainder of the provinces (with  the exception of Guangdong) were in
a deficit position.  In these cases, the province was allowed to retain all of
its fixed and shared revenue collections and the central government paid a
subsidy equivalent to the size of the 1983 deficit.  Eight of these deficit
provinces--the autonomous regions, the provincos with heavy minority
populatione and those which are least developed--were singled out for special
treatment.  They were to receive the deficit subsidy, but this amount was to
be increased by 10% per year.  Apparently, 10%  was taken as a number that
would roughly approximate needed revenue growth.  In fact, the 10% increment
was given in 1986 but was reduced to 5% in 1987 and 1988 with the intention to
eliminate it in 1989.
42.  This approach has now undergone major changes, with a growing number of
provinces contracting with the center for a delivery of a fixed tax quota,
following the example of Guangdong, which retained all fixed local and shared
collections, but turned over a fixed annual amount of Rmb 778 million to the
center.  This was a first step toward the proposed 1988 reforms, under the
name of "provincial contracting."
43.  Since 1988, most provinces have "bargained down" the center in contracts
which reduce their obligations to share and transfer funds.  The purpose of
this program is to give these provinces greater incentives to collect more
taxes.  Since 1988, contracting has been applied in most of China's prosperous
(and  high-yield) provinces and cities including Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Hebei,
6/  This formula has been adapted a number of times since 1984 to adjust for
the transfer of state-owned enterprises from provincial to central owner-
ship.- 13  -
Table  3a.  CHINA: REVENUE-SHARING  SYSTEM  BETWEEN  THE  CENTRAL
AND  PROVINCIAL  GOVERNMENTS,  1985-1988
Percentage  of total  Province
Provinces  cotlections  receives  subsidy  Fixed  or contract
and  regions  retained  b  Province  aereed from the  Center a/  delivery  to  the  Center
1985  1986  1987  1985  1986  1987  1985  1986  1987
X)I  ------------ tin  millions  of yuan)  ------------------
North  China
Beijing  48.2  49.55  49.55
Tianjin  39.5  39.45  39.55
Hebel  69.0  72.00  72.00
Shanxi  97.5  97.50  97.50
Inner  Mongolia  1783*  1961.74  2059.83
Northeast  China
Liaoning  51.1  52.66  52.66
Jilin  397  396.62  396.62
Heilongiiang  96.0  142.70 142.70
East  China
Shanghai  26.0  23.54  23.54
Jiangsu  39.0  41.00  41.00
An Hui  80.1  80.10  80.10
Fujian  235  234.86  234.86  --
Jiangxi  239  239.46  239.46
Shandong  59.0  77.47  75.0
Central/South  China
Henan  81.0  81.00  87.1)
Hubei  66.5  100.00 100.09
Hunan  88.0  88.00  88.0(
Guangdong  772.08  778.08  778.00
Guangxi  716*  788.03  827.43
Southwest  China
Sichuan  89.0  100.00 100.00
Guizhou  743*  817.57  858.45
Yunnan  637*  925.88  972.17
Tibet  750*  825.32  866.59
Northwest  China
Shaanxi  270  270.26  270.26
Gansu  246  245.60  245.60
Qinghai  611*  671.88  705.47
Ningxis  494*  543.14  570.30
Xinjiang  1450*  1594.85  1674.59
Source: Data  supplied  by  MOF.
a/  Asterisk  indicates  subsidies  were  to increase  by 10%  per  year  after  1985.
Two asterisks  indicate  quota  contract  delivery,  also  known  as "provincial"  contracting.  No informa-
tion  available  on amounts.
Information  not  available  for the  province's  arrangements  with  the  Center  for 1988.
Beijing, Tianjin, Guangdong and Shanghai (see  Table 3b).  Under this system, a
basic  amount (quota)  of shared revenues must be transferred to the central
government while revenues collected over and above this quota may be kept in
full by the province or city (see  belowl.Table  3b:  China: Central-Local  Revenue-Sharing  Contracts  198P-90
(i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v)  (vi) Basic  Sharing  with  Growth  Incremental  Sharing  Fixed  Quota  with  Growth Basic  Contracted  Basic  Fixed  Initial  Contracted  Payment Basic  Retention  Rate  of  Retention  Marginal  Quota  Amount  Amnuat  Rate  to  Deficit Sharing  Rate  Increase  Rate  Retention  to  State  to  State  of  Increase  Provinces Rate  X  ()()  Y 100  mn.)  (7 100  on.)  (X)  (t  100  mn.)
Beijing  *  50.0  4.0  - Hebei  - 70.0  4.5  - Liaoning  - 58.3  .5  - Shenyang  - 30.3  4.0  - Harbin  - 45.0  5.0  - Jiangsu  - 41.0  5.0  - Zhejiang  - 61.5  6.5  - Ningbo  27.9  5.3
Henan  - 80.0  5.0 Chongqfng/a  - 33.5  4.0
Tianjin  46.5  - -
Shanxi  87.6




7.4 Yurnan  - - - - - - - - 6.7 Qinghai  - - - - - - - - 6.6 Hainan  - - - - - - - 1.4
Source: Ministry  of  Finance
/e  After  the  cities  of  Wuhan  and  Chongqing  were  separated  from  Hubei  and  Sichuan  provinces,  the  provinces  changed from  net  providers  to  the  state  to  net  recipients of  suibsidies  from  the  state.  Data  are  not  avaLtable  on  the  other  "independent  cities",  such as Nanjing,  Ningpo,  etc.- 15  -
44.  Another important change in the past two years has been to create
"special cities" which hava a direct relationship with the central government
and whose revenue-sharing arrangement is independent of the arrangement which
exists for their province.  As of 1991, these include Harbin, Changzou,
Shenyang, Dalian, Quingdao, Xian, Chengdu, Chongqing, Wuhan, Nianjing, Ningpo,
Xiamen, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen.
45.  There are now 6 basic variants of the "quota" and sharing arrangements in
which provinces contract with the central government.  Table 3b outlines them
for the 1988-90 period, both for the provinces and for the cities with
independent status.  These six main types of contracts under which transfers
are effected from the provinces to the central government can be characterized
as:7/
li)  "Basic Sharing" - a fixed proportion of all revenue is remitted to
the center;
(ii)  "Basic Sharing with Growth Adiustment" - based on 1987 revenue, the
localities retain a specified proportion ranging from 28 percent to 80
percent of any revenue that is within a certain percentage growth
(ranging from 3.5 to 6.5 percent) from the previous year (revenue in
excess of this growth rate is retained entirely by the province);
(iii)  "Incremental Sharing" - a certain proportion is retained up to a
quota, and then a different (usually  higher) proportion of revenue is
retained in excess of the quota;
(iv)  "Fixed Ouota Delivery" - a specific nominal amount is contracted to
be transferred to the center with no annual adjustments;
(v)  "Fixed  ouota with Growth Adiustment" - a specified nominal amount is
contracted to go to the center in the initial year; in subsequent years,
the amount was to increase at a contracted rate (7  percent or 9 percent).
(vi)  Deficit provinces continue to receive fixed subsidies.
46.  As the sharing proportions in Table 3b show, the provinces in which
significant revenue is collected (Shanghai, Liaoning, Beijing) retain a
significant proportion of what they collect, and that incremental sharing and
growth rates are quite low, the latter well below GDP growth.
47.  While the provincial contracting arrangements can provide increased
incentives to collect revenue, they do not eliminate the potential tonflict of
interest between local and central governments, nor do they alleviate a
crucial problem associated with decentralization, that is, the loss of control
and flexibility by the Center over the use of tax policy for microeconomic
purposes.
48.  Moreover, the provincial contracting system, if more widely applied, can
lead to negative revenue consequences for the center.  The fact that most
important contracts are fixed in nominal terms has left an increased share of
fiscal resources in the hands of local governments.  This reduces the growth
and, potentially, the real volume of resources in the hands of central
government.  Finally, the provincial contract arrangement introduces a pro-
cyclical bias to the fiscal system.  This occurs because the revenue received
7/  There is, in fact, an infinite variety of these sharing and
quota/incremental contracts and it is to some extent forced to categorize
them in this fashion.  Essentially, these are bargains, not a revenue-
sharing "system."- 16 -
by the central government under a "fixed rominal" contract remains relatively
constant regardless of the underlying growth of economic activity.
B.  PROBLEMS AND ISSUES IN CENTER/LOCAL FINANCE IN CHINA
49.  China's experience with fiscal decentralization is  marked by four
patterns.  First, as decentralization has proceeded, the share of taxes in GNP
has declined.  Second, the "fiscai surplus" available to the central
government--the excess of its total direct expenditures over its direct
revenue collections--has fallen (see  Table 2).  Third, local governments have
taken a great deal of discretion in the implementation of tax policy, with
important results:  (a)  the application of the "national" tax system varies
widely from province to province, and (b)  use of the tax system to promote
provincial or local goals has not always been in keeping with central guide-
lines.  This reduced central leverage over fiscal revenues has led to problems
of macroeconomic management, an erosion of the revenue base, allocative
distortions, and generally to a more ad hoc tax system.  Fourth, revisions to
the revenue sharing system have had the effect of improving the relative
fiscal position of higher income provinces.  This pattern of change raises
some important problems which must be faced in restructuring central-local
relations in China.  Moreover, the current system may represent an important
impediment to price reforms and reforms addressing enterprise restructuring,
both of which are important system reforms in the next Plan period.
Compatibilitv with System Reforms
50.  China's reform program in the Eighth Plan has the implementation of price
reform and enterprise reform as its twin linchpins.  The present system of
central-local fiscal relations cannot support these reforms.
51.  Consider first the area of price reforms.  Since localities receive
revenues from their locally owned enterprises, and also have an entitlement to
all sales and excise taxes generated in their locality, local revenues can be
markedly affected by price reform.  Increasing market prices for intermediate
goods, for example, would greatly improve the collection potential of profits
and sales tax in provinces producing such goods.  Provinces such as Shaanxi
and other raw materials producers would benefit both by the  increase in the
tax base, and by the fact that their fixed nominal tax contract to the center
was tailored to profits and value added tax yields estimated on the basis of
lower pre-reform prices and profit levels.8/  Conversely, in the absence of
retail price liberalization, provinces using basic raw materials would see
their enterprises' profitability decline (and their tax yield correspondingly
lower),9/ and would find it correspondingly harder to meet the terms of the
contract.  To illustrate the magnitude of these potential effects, the data in
Table 4 show, for major sectors in China's input/output table, the provinces
which are the largest producers of commodities subject to price controls.
Column 4 shows an indication of the proportion of the total output nationwide,
subject to such controls on the assumption that retail prices in general are
8/  The interprovincial impact could be quantified using an input-output
framework.  A corresponding sharing or transfer system could also be
devised which would modify tax contracts in line with the shifts in tax
yields implied by price reform.  However, since prices will continue to
undergo adjustment, such transfer system would require ongoing
adjustments following each price change.
9/  If both intermediate and final goods prices are liberalized, provinces
which are predominantly intermediates-producing  would gain, while "proce-
ssing provinces" could come out about equal, gaining from the increase in
final goods prices, but losing from the higher input prices.- 17  -
Table  4:  CHINA: PRICE  CONTROLLED  PRODUCTS:  SHARES  OF GROSS  VALUE  OF INDUSTRIAL
OUTPUT  (GVIO)  OF THE  LARGEST  PRODUCING  PROVINCES  IN  1989
(percentage  shares  into  total  sectoral  GVIO)
(1)  (2)  (3)
Total  Share  Sales
of Top  3  to Final  Total
Province  Provinces  Consumers  GVIO  by sector
(X)  CX)  (Y  billion)
Smelting  and  pressing  Liaoning  (17.1)
of ferrous  metals  Shangha (12.7)  38.0  1  114.0
Sichuan  (8.3)
Smelting  and  pressin  Liaoning  (9.9)
of nonferrous  metals  Gansu  (7.5)  24.2  1  47.15
Shanghai  (6.8)
Metal  products  Jianssu  (12.1)
Shanghai  t10.0)  31.5  1  49.42
Guangdong  (9.4)
Electrical  equipment  Guangdong  (14.6)
and  machinery  Jiangsu  (11.7)  36.9  9  84.98
Sha  ghai (10.6)
Electronic  & telecom.  equip.  Jiangsu  (19.4)
Shanghai  (12.9)  40.7  - 55.12
Guangdong  (8.3)
Coal  mining  &  dressing  Shanxi  (19.3)
Shandong  (10.7)  38.6  26  40.81
Henan  (8.6)
Petroleum  processing  Liaoning  (19.7)
Shandong  (10.7)  43.1  5  45.73
Heilongjiang  (11.3)
Petroleum  and  natural  Heilongjiang  (37.2j
gas extraction  Shandong  (19.1)  65.4  5  36.24
Liaoning  (9.1)
Chemicals  and  allied  products  Jiangsu  (13.2)
Li  oning  (7.1)  27.2  2  137.53
Shanghai  (6.9)
Machine  building  industry  Jiangsu  (12.7)
Shanghai  (10.9)  32.0  8  172.66
Liaoning  (8.4)
Food  manufacturing  Jiangsu  (9.9)
Shandong  (9.4)  27.1  - 120.30
Hunan  (7.9)
Textile  industry  Jiangsu  (18.7)
Shandong  (10.7)  39.9  74  210.96
Zhejiang  (10.5)
Paper  making  and  paper  prod.  Shandong (8.7)
Guangdong (7.5)  23.5  39  37.21
Liaoning  (7.4)
Other  industry  Guangdong (18.1)
Jiangsu  (14.1)  39.3  66  7.24
Zhejiang  (7.1)
Source:  China:  Sta*istical  Yearbook  1990,  pp.  405-18.
largely liberalized;  intermediate sales are price controlled to varying
degrees.  The magnitude and distribution of the positive impact of price
liberalization is a function of the wedge between market and controlled
prices, and the share of price-controlled output in provincial GVIO.  [Data  on
the largest users (who  would be negatively impacted) are not available.]52.It
is because tax contracts and quotas are fixed in nominal terms and based on
the present provincial tax bases and estimaterd  yields, that price reform
implies shifts in the effective burden of fixed nominal contracts.  If
contracts were instead defined as a share of total collections (as  they were- 18 -
earlier), the tax yield and the contracted amount due would change in the same
proportion, and price reform would not give rise to these effects.  The strong
vested interests of some provinces in the existing status quo, could form a
powerful impediment to price reform unless the fiscal system can be redesigned
to compensate their losses.
53.  The present system of intergovernmental contracting is similarly
unsupportive of the enterprise reforms needed to strengthen industrial policy.
As pointed out by many researchers on China, a major objective of China's
industrial policy is to integrate its markets and reap the benefits of
industrial specialization and economies of scale.  The present fiscal system,
by contrast, is a prime contributor to the widely-noted tendency for local
governments to set up identical industries with inefficient plant scale and
lack of regional specialization, since localities reap the taxes from
enterprises they own.  The preference for setting up processing industries--
which yield higher value added under the present distorted centrally-guided
price structure--is further encouraged by the design of the fiscal sharing
system under which provinces retain incremental tax yields above a nominal tax
quota.l0/
54.  The rationalization of industrial structure, and esp-cially the
improvements in scope and scale economies which can be achieved through a
well-executed strategy of horizontal integration or cooperation between
enterprises, enterprise mergers, and enterprise industrial groups, is
difficult to implement in the current system.  This is because the revenue-
sharing system, under which revenues accrue to the level of government
(provincial, local, etc.) owning the enterprise, interferes with mergers
across localities, since this would require agreement on the sourcing and
subsequent division of profits.l1/  A system in which ownership plays no
role in the accrual of fiscal revenue to localities would be preferable.
The Macroeconomic Perspective
55.  Hitherto in China and other socialist economies, the stabilization aspect
of tax policy was not a major concern, since most sources of macroeconomic
instability--unforeseen (or  unwanted) changes in investment, consumption and
savings--were "controlled" by planners.  The present reforms decentralize
decision-making, and make it necessary for planners to give more consideration
to the stabilization aspects of fiscal policy.  This in turn requires improved
management of the major tax instruments.
56.  From a macroeconomic ,gerspective,  the present fiscal system has three
shortcomings.  First, provincial contracting has been an important factor
contributing to the lower income elasticity of government revenues.  Second,
by locking in a relatively fixed revenue level for a multiyear period,
contracts deprive the central and local governments of a flexible revenue
source and, in fact, introduce a procyclical bias to the fiscal system.  Reve-
nue received by the central government under the prevailing "fixed tax quota"
system remains relatively constant regardless of the underlying growth of
economic activity.  (Even  where the center collects a small share of above-
quota collections, its revenues still grow more slowly than GNP because the
above quota sharing rate tends to be low.)  By contrast, rapid economic growth
10/  See China:  Between Plan and Market, Red Cover Report 1990, World Bank
for further discussion, and Tidrick and Chen, China's Industrial Reforms,
Oxford University Press, 1988.
11/  Even in countries as advanced as the United States, the determination of
the base for state-level corporate income taxes is a difficult
proposition.  Complicated formulae are used to prorate the base for firms
with multi-state locations.- 19 -
increases the revenues realized by local governments (which feel the full
fiscal effect of booms).
57.  Since local governments do not have demand management responsibilities,
they may increase their spending when a booming economy produces higher
revenues (producing the multiplier effect of a "balanced budget"), but would
not, as might the central government, try to dampen agg-egate demand.
Alternatively, local governments could respond to economic booms by targeting
collections to some fixed revenue level.  In this case, those resources which
would have been taxed are retained by enterprises to further fuel aggregate
demand through the multiplier effect of a "tax cut."  Either local response
will be expansionary and procyclical.  Similarly, but in reverse, in an
economic downturn, provincial contracts which are fixed in nominal terms would
produce a drain on local fiscal resources, reducing consumption and
procyclically intensifying the downswing, unless, at the central level, this
is offset by a compensating budgetary stance.
58.  The third shortcoming of the present quota-based system derives from its
lack of flexibility.  The provincial quotas' three- to five-year terms lock
the central government into a relatively fixed revenue level which is not
fully responsive to growth in either output or prices.  Thus, the central
government is deprived of a flexible fiscal tool.  The result is that the
center has less discretion over net spending, and a less effective fiscal
instrument for fine-tuning the economy.  Local governments have been delegated
the responsibility for tax administration, absent effective central monitoring
and oversight, and the authority to grant tax relief within their juris-
dictions.  This effectively severs the link between revenue policy (and tax
policy) set at the central level and collections at the local level, and has
put local governments in the position of determining effective tax rates and
collection levels.
59.  The reduced flexibility over tax policy emerging as a result of this
specific form of decentralized fiscal arrangement represents a potentially
worrisome development.  Because this decentralized fiscal arrangement gives
local governments discretion in determining the total revenue take, the center
cannot run a fiscal policy suitable for and responsive to differing economic
conditions.  The Chinese government must weigh the benefits of this form of
fiscal decentralization against the costs of reduced capacity for central
management and direction over tax policy.
60.  To improve central r.tanagement  of revenues, expenditures, and
stabilization policy, it may be necessary to reduce local governments'
discretion over tax relief and to monitor their tax administration.  The
status quo with regard to central and local finances appe&rs untenable in the
long run, and mechanisms need to be developed--some combination of new taxes
for local governments, a reassignment of existing taxes or a different sharing
of tax bases, a different assignment of expenditure responsibilities--to serve
better both central and local interests.
Revenue Adeouacv
61.  Fiscal decentralization has shifted economic resources from the general
government sector to the enterprise sector.  Specif-cally, while the yield of
the Chinese tax system has kept pace with prices and population (i.e.,  there
has been positive, but low, real revenue growth in the 1980s), it has not kept
pace with growth in total real incomes or output.  For the local government
sector specifically, the ratio of taxes collected to GDP fell from
19.4 percent in 1980 to 10.8 percent in 1989, while for the center, it rose
from 4.6 percent to 9.3 percent in 1986,  before falling to 6.5 percent in 1989-20  -
(see Table 5 and Chart 1).12/  Sinc" the inception of provincial contract-
ing there has also been a decline in the share of revenues accruing to the
central government.  This shift in resources between central and local govern-
ment does not appear to have been commensurate with any change in their
respective expenditure responsibilities.
62.  Judging overall revenue adequacy is difficult in the absence of concreta
projections  of  expenditure needs.  However, one can safely say that public
service levels are deficient in all parts of China, and the infrasturcture gap
is likely to be an especially critical problem in the future.  Moreover, many
reforms--especially those which attempt to replace enterprise-based services
with privately or government-provided equivalents such as housing reform,
socia) security reform and education financing--almost certainly will not be
expenditure-neutral and may well incroase the financial burden on all levels
of government.l3/
63  Judging whether the "balance" is right, i.e., whether the system
generates sufficient revenues for the respective levels of government, is also
difficult in the absence of estimates of expenditure needs for each level of
government.  However, the data do tell us that the balance is changing.  The
central government's share of revenue collections has increased (see  Table 5)
over the period 1980-86; however, this was not because of a strengthening of
central government revenue-raising capacity.  It is primarily because
provincial and local government revenue collections as a percent of GDP fell
by nearly half.  This decline largely reflects a shifting of the financial
resources to the enterprise sector.  Since 1986, the balance of financial
resources seems to have shifted back toward provincial and local governments
as  central government revenues collected also have begun to decline as a share
of GDP.  Real revenue collections by the central government declined by 4
billion yuan between 1986 and 1989.
64.  Provincial and local collections over the 1980s have grown in real terms,
but have not kept pace with GDP.14/  The reasons may include "tax
preferences" given to enterprises, lax administration; central revenue-sharing
policies which reduce local collection incentives (tax  effort), or central
policies which reduce enterprise profits (such  as wage or price changes) and
thereby the provincial tax base.
65.  On the exnenditure side, the center's direct share of expenditures
(Table 5 and Chart 3) has fallen from 53 percent in 1980 to 36 perc3nt in
12/  The center's major collection vehicles include customs duties, revenues
from centrally owned enterprises and joint-venture firms.  Generally
speaking, revenues collected by the center accrue to the center.  Reve-
nuee collected by localities are in fact "central revenues" but subject
to sharing.
13/  One cannot safely say that the overall decline in the tax-GDP ratio means
a reduction in government financia'l  capacity.  Against the 1980-89
decline of 4 percent of GDP, one must set off the reduced claim by
enterprises on general government revenues.
14/  Data note:  Revenue data (unadjusted)  presented in Table 5 includa--as
per the standard Chinese budgetary format--central government borrowing,
both foreign and domestic in the revenue base.  This substantially
overstates (especially since 1982  when the borrowing became important)
the true amount of central revenue.  Obtaining a closer picture of the
central revenue trend requires adjusting the central collections by the
amount of central borrowing.  Local data require no such adjustment, as
local government revenues do not include borrowing.  The results of this
tabulation are shown in Table 4 under "central revenue (adjusted)."- 20a  -
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CENTRAL Expand.IGNP  -4-  LOCAL  Exp*nd./GNPTable  5:  TAX COLLECTION  AND  EXPENDITURE
By Level  of  Government 1980-90
billions  of  R
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
Total  revenues collected  108.5  108.9  112.4  124.9  150.1  186.6  231.0  236.0  262.8  285.9 Central  government  21.0  22.5  25.8  37.2  52.4  69.0  91.7  83.3  94.5  107.2 of  which:  borrowing  --  7.3  8.4  8.0  7.7  10.0  13.9  16.9  23.1  22.0 Local  goverrnent  87.5  86.5  86.6  87.7  97.7  117.6  134.3  152.7  168.3  178.7 of  which:  own  11.8  11.6  12.5  15.3  15.9  19.0  --  --  --  --
Total  expenditure  121.2  111.5  115.3  128.4  153.6  186.5  233.0  242.5  263.5  295.0 Centrat  65.0  60.2  57.5  64.2  72.8  81.9  96.2  95.8  94.6  -- Local  56.2  51.3  57.8  65.8  80.8  104.6  136.8  146.7  168.9  --
Central  collections  deficit  -44.0  -37.7  -31.7  -27.0  -20.4  -12.9  -4.5  -12.5  -0.1 Funded  by:
Local  collections  surplus:  31.3  35.2  28.8  21.9  16.9  13.0  -2.5  6.0  -0.6  -- Central  borrowing  - 7.3  8.4  8.0  7.7  10.0  13.9  16.9  23.1  22.0
Total  revenue  collections  (adjusted)  108,5  101.7  104.0  116.9  142.4  176.6  212.1  219.1  239.7  263.9 Central  21.0  15.2  17.4  29.2  44.7  59.0  77.8  66.4  71.4  85.2 Local  87.5  86.5  86.6  87.7  97.7  117.6  134.3  152.7  168.3  178.7
(in  percent)
Total  expenditure  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 Centre  L  53.63%  53.99X  49.87X  50.00X  47.40X  43.91Z  41.29Z  39.51X  35.90X  - Local  46.37X  46.01X  50.13%  51,251  52.601  56.09%  58.711  60.491  64.101  -
Total  revenues  collected  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 Central  19.35X  20.66%  22.95%  29.781  34.91X  36.98%  39.701  35.301  35.96%  37.501 LocaL  80.651  79.43%  77.05%  70.22%  65.09%  63.02%  58.14X  64.701  64.041  62.50X
Total  revenues  coltected  (adjusted)
Central  19.351  14.951  16.73X  24.98%  31.39X  33.411  36.68X  30.31X  29.79X  32.28X Local  80.65%  85.05%  83.27%  75.02X  68.61X  66.591  63.32X  69.69X  70.211  67.72%
(in  X of  GNP)
Revenues  collected/GNP  24.27X  22.811  21.67X  21.59%  21.681  21.851  23.77X  20.781  18.96%  18.17X Central  4.70%  4.71X  4.971  6.43%  7.571  8.081  9.431  7.331  6.821  6.811 Local  19.57X  18.121  16.70%  15.161  14.11%  13.77%  13.821  13.451  12.14%  11.36% Central  adjusted  revenues  4.701  3.18%  3.36%  5.05%  6.461  6.911  8.001  5.851  5.15X  5.42%
Expenditures/ANP  27.111  2,.35%  22.231  22.201  22.181  21.841  23.971  21.351  19.011  - Central  14.541  12.611  11.091  11.10%  10.51%  9.59X  9.90X  8.441  6.831  - Local  12.577  10.741  11.15%  11.381  11.67X  12.25%  14.071  12.92X  12.191
Memo Items:
Real  rewenues  collected  108.5  107.0  110.1  120.4  137.2  156.4  183.8  177.6  180.2  179.5 Central  21.0  ,22.1  25.3  35.9  47.9  57.8  73.0  62.7  64.8  67.3 Local  87.5  85.0  84.8  84.6  89.3  98.6  106.8  114.9  115.4  112.2
Real revenue  collection  growth
Central  5.25%  14.331  41.96%  33.52%  20.751  26.131  -14.081  3.41X  3.831  - Local  -2.891  -0.18X  -0.291  5.60%  10.38%  8.39%  7.54%  0.46X  -2.82X  -
GNP  447.1  477.5  518.6  578.4  692.4  854.0  972.0  1135.7  138'5.8  1573.1 Deflator  100.0  101.8  102.1  103.7  109.4  119.3  125.7  132.9  145.8  159.3
Source: MOF- 22 -
1988.  As a percentage of GDP, the center's expenditures have fallen from
about 14.0 percent in 1980 to 6.8 percent in 1988, with a corresponding, but
substantially smaller decline in the provincial share, from 13.0 percent to
12 percent.  Again, these declines are indicative of the shift in resources to
the enterprise sector.
66.  To get a true picture of what has happened to the balance of fiscal power
in the Chinese intergovernmental syster.m  in the 1980s, the revenue and
expenditure sides must be considered together.  While the provinces' revenue
and expenditures have both fallen as a percentage of GNP, their revenue share
has fallen faster.  As a result, the provincial "surplus" available for
transfer to the center has shrunk in nominal terms (see  Chart 4).  In 1980,
the center financed almost 50 percent of its total expenditures from local
transfers, and provinces spent only two-thirds of what they collected and
transferrea the remainder to the center.  By 1986, the provinces' direct
expenditures were 1 percent greater than their collections and the center
tranbferred net, to them, Y 2.5 billion (4 percent of its expenditures).  By
1988, there was a transfer to the provinces of Y 0.6 billion.  Thus, while in
the past the ceiter could spend more than it collected--in 1980, some
50 percer.t  more--this discretionary expenditure authority has been eroded
since 1986 (see Table 2).15/  There are many reasons for this.  Provincial
contracting has reduced the net transfer to the center, as has enterprise
contracting which has reduced the revenue share being "passed up."
67.  one might be tempted to interpret this as "greater balance," i.e., each
level of government is now spending about what it raises.  This would not be
correct:  any discussion of revenue adequacy needs to be put in the context of
the expenditure responsibilities of each level of government.  There are also
important implications of this "self-sufficiency" of the national government
sector for stabilization and equalization capabilities.  This shift means that
the central government's ability to use discretionary policy to redistribute
fiscal resources among provinces, or to manage national budget finances (i.e.,
to run a surplus or deficit), is much more limited in 1989 than in 1980.
68.  These trends also show that the central government has borrowed in order
to maintain its expenditure share, i.e., to replace revenues provided earlier
by the provinces.  (First differences of provincial collections as a share of
GNP have declined since 1986 approximately in parallel with increased central
borrowing, and in 1989, by more than the center's borrowing.)  Continuation of
these trends could complicate macroeconomic management, as central borrowing
to make up for reduced local transfers adds to demand pressures.  And if these
funds are not used for capital purposes, this practice shifts the payment for
current services to future years.
Ircentives for Tax Avoidance
69.  The tax-sharing system in China presents provincial and local governments
with mixed incentives to improve their tax administration efforts and may
dampen revenue mobilization efforts.  Simply put, high sharing rates may
encourage tax avoidance:  if provinces cannot keep all that they collect, they
may not put much effort into collection.  Many avenues are open for "tax
avoidance" including concessions to help enterprises over hardship periods,
tax holidays to encourage new activities, and enterprise contracts with
reduced tax liabilities to generate a "supply-side" response--all within the
spirit and the letter of the law.  Local governments can also allow evasion by
becoming more lax in assessment and collection efforts and permitting
enterprises to underdeclare tax liability.
70.  Local interests in stimulating local economic activities give rise to
strong forces aaainst collecting tax revenues, particularly those that must be
shared with the center at a high rate.  Local tax exemptionei  allow resources
to remain under local jurisdiction, to be tapped through "voluntary"
IS/  Expenditure data for 1989 and 1990 are not available.- 23 -
contributions that are not shared with the center.  Thus, while the effective
tax and nontax burden on enterprises may not be reduced, budgetary revenue of
the central government is eroded (see  Annex 1 for a formal treatment).
Whether the retention rates in China are high enough to encourage good tax
administration is an oven question.  Higher retention rates may be needed to
convince local governmente to tax the marginal dollar into the public budget
rather than leave it in enterprises' retained earnings.16/  Alternatively,
it may not be feasible for the present shared tax system to coexist with local
responsibility for tax collection and discretion in administration.  While the
quota arrangement can in principle provide incentives to collect revenue, the
conflict of interest between local and central governments remains.  There is
also no guarantee that the "supply-side',  response--assuming it is achieved
through these contracts--will materialize in a way that can be easily
predicted and coordinated with expenditure plans or other macro requirements.
Provincial Tax Effort
,I.  Collections data show that, on average, the richer provinces collected
more revenue per capita than poorer provinces over the 1980-86 period (see Box
Table 1 and Annex Table 4).  However, revenue growth in six of the ten richest
provinces was below the national average, while nine of the ten poorest
provinces had above-average growth in revenue collections (See  Annex Table 6).
The extent to which provinces are exploiting their tax base thus clearly needs
to be addressed (see  Box 2 for a discussion of the measurement of provincial
tax effort.)  For policy purposes, the Chinese government wants to know not
only which provinces have a greater capacity to collect revenues, but how
extensively they use this capacitv.  Otherwise, there is the risk of
subnational governments letting central transfers substitute for what other-
wise would have been increased local government revenue mobilization.
72.  A first approximation of revenue effort is the "tax ratio," i.e., the
rates of revenues to gross output (see column (1)  of Box table].  The "tax
ratio" in Shanghai was 18 percent compared to 9.8 percent in Gansu and
8.7 percent on average for all provinces.  This is only a partial measure of
tax effort, because much of the interprovincial variation would be expected
due to differences in taxable capacity relating to levels of income and
urbanization.  The tax ratio does not therefore show that higher-income
Shanghai exerts more than twice the revenue effort of Gansu.  In fact,
comparing tax collections to estimated "taxable capacity" suggests that Gansu
actually makes a greater revenue effort than Shanghai.  In general, it would
appear that many of the higher income provinces make a lower level of revenue
effort:  Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shandong and Liaoning all make below average
efforts and Shanghai is just about average.  While tax collections are lower
in provinces where per capita income is lower, many low-income provinces
raise more revenue than might be expected given their economic base (column
3).
Incentives for Infrastructure Development
73.  While infrastructure bottlenecks are a major problem facing almost all
Chinese localities, the fiscal system accentuates the capital financing gap
16/  Finance Minister Wang Bingqian stated that some people "evaded taxes,
retained a larger share of profits than they were entitled to for their
own enterprises, falsified accounts about losses to secure subsidies, and
diverted state funds to uses other than those prescribed..." (1987  Budget
speeches).  Many of the provinces "hold back" on the proper level of tax
remittance, authorizing preferential tax treatment of certain firms, and
thereby lowering the total taxable base.  In this way, the after-tax
profits of locally owned firms may be increased and more resources may be
"kept at home" in the province.- 24  -
Box  2: PROVINCIAL  TAX  EFFORT
Taxable  capacity  of  a  province  is  measured  as  a  function  of  its  income  level  and  its  degree  of  urbaniza-
tion.  The  higher  the  level  of  per  capita  income--proxied  here  by  the  per  capita  gross  value  of  output--the
greater  the  capacity  to  raise  profit  and  sales  taxes.  Urbanization  may  also  contribute  to  taxable  capacity
because  urban  economic  activities  are  more  easily  reached  by  the  ackninistrative  system  (provide  better  tax
handles)  than  do  ruraL  activities.l/  The  results  show  that  taxable  capacity  is  significantly  higher  if  per
capita  output  is  higher,  and  is  positively  (though  not  significantly)  retated  to  the  level  of  urbanization.
Using  this  estimated  relationship,  one  can  predict  the  tax  ratio,  based  on  a  provinces's  per  capita  income  and
urbanization.  To  take  Beijing  as  an  example,  one  could  say  that,  based  on  the  average  practice  and  its  own
Level  of  per  capita  output  and  urbanization,  we  would  "expect"  Beijing's  revenue  ratio,  or  taxable  capacity,  to
be  12.78  percent.?1
Tax  effort  is  the  extent  to  which  a  province  uses  this  capacity,  and  may  be  measured  as  the  ratio  of  the
actual  rate  at  which  output  is  taxed  (Box  Table  1,  column  1)  to  estimated  taxable  capacity.  To  follow  the
example  above,  we  expect  Beijing  to  raise  revenues  equivalent  to  12.78  percent  of  output  (coLumn  2),  the
province  actually  raised  15.24  percent  in  1986  (column  1),  hence  there  is  an  above  average  effort--specifically
an  effort  which  is  19  percent  above  average  as  is  shown  by  the  effort  index  of  1.19  in  column  3  of  the  Table
below.  Shanghai,  by  contrast,  raises  questions  about  what  would  be  expected  and  makes  an  average  tax  effort
with  an  index  of  1.01.
j/  The  method  used  here  follows  the  approach  developed  in  Roy  Bahl,  "A  Regression  Approach  to  Tax  Effort  and
Tax  Ratio  Analysis,"  International  Monetary  Fund  Staff  Papers,  Vol.  18,  No.  3,  November  1971.
2/  The  average  relationship  between  the  share  of  output  raised  and  these  two  indicators  of  taxable  capacity  is
determined  from  a linear  OLS  estimate  as  described  in  the  following  equation:
T/Y  0.059  +  1.514  (E-05)  Y/P  +  0.0002  u
(5.168)  (0.600)
where  T  2  tax  colLections
Y  =  gross  vaLue  of  industrial  output
P  = population
u  =  percent  of  population  living  .n  urban  areas
l 2  0.63,  and  t-values  shown  in  parenthesis
Box  Table  1: COMPARISONS  OF  TAXABLE  CAPACITY  AND  TAX  EFFORT  BY  PROVINCE
Ratio  of  budgetary  "Taxable  Index  of  Tax  Percent  Ranking:  Per
coLlection  to  capacity"  tax  effort  effort  of  total  capita  national
Province gross  output,  1986  1986  1.0  /a  ranking population income:  1985
Beiiing  1S.24  12.78  1.19  5  0.92  2
Tianjin  14.42  13.30  1.08  8  0.78  3
Hebei  7.52  8.90  0.94  15  5.33  14
Shanxi  8.93  8.48  1.05  9  2.52  12
Inner  Mongolia  7.87  7.92  0.99  13  1.93  16
Liaonirz  9.75  10.57  0.92  15  3.54  4
Jilin  7.75  9.09  0.85  18  - 8
HeiLongjiang  7.82  9.09  0.86  17  3.18  5
Shanghai  18.06  17.95  1.01  11  1.17  1
Jiangsu  6.30  9.49  0.66  19  5.97  6
Zhejiang  7.93  9.18  0.86  17  3.87  7
Anhui  6.49  7.55  0.86  17  4.95  21
Fujian  9.35  8.05  1.16  6  2.61  17
Jiangxi  7.10  7.59  0.94  15  3.32  22
Shandong  5.44  8.70  0.63  20  7.39  10
Henan  7.45  7.42  1.00  12  7.41  25
Hubei  7.63  8.49  0.90  16  4.74  11
Hunan  8.06  7.73  1.04  10  5.40  19
Guangdong  8.51  8.33  1.02  11  6.01  9
Guangxi  8.90  7.43  1.20  4  3.72  28
Sichuan  7.18  7.52  0.96  14  9.79  26
Guizhou  8.79  7.18  1.23  3  2.85  29
Yunnan  12.35  7.28  1.70  1  3.27  27
Tibet  6.02  6.97  0.86  17  0.19  18
Shaanxi  7.86  7.84  1.00  12  2.88  24
Gansu  9.86  7.76  1.27  2  1.96  23
Qinghai  7.85  7.69  1.02  11  0.39  15
Ningxia  8.61  7.74  1.11  7  0.40  20
Xinjiang  6.25  8.14  7.68  - 1.31  13
/a  Tax  effort tax  collections  as  a  percentage  of  taxable  capacity.- 25 -
and discourages local governments from spending a greater share of their
budgets for capital purposes.  Only two taxes are specifically earmarked for
capital construction and maintenance:  the UCMT and the public utility
surcharge.  In theory and rhetoric, these taxes are intended to nncourage
spending to improve the capital stock, but they remain a very small share of
total local resources and of total capital construction financing.
74.  A second constraint is the absence of a formal mechanism for local
governments to borrow for capital construction, even if repayment potential is
not in question.  Long-lived and expensive projects must be financed from
current general revenues, ad-hoc grants from higher-level governments,
accumulated savings from current revenue, or enterprise "contributions."  The
inability to borrow shifts the full burden of financing a project with future
benefits onto current taxpayers and the general public, rather than on future
users of the facility and specific beneficiaries.  This raises the price of
infrastructure investments and enhances the relative attractiveness of
expenditures with current benefits.17/
75.  Second, there are no formal programs of "benefit" or "user" charges to
finance capital projects.  Even where project beneficiaries exhibit a strong
willingness to pay, there is no mechanism to tap this willingness, so that
desired projects may go unfinanced.  Instead, localities have turned to ad-hoc
levies and "fiscal predation" of enterprises, both of which contribute to the
erratic and nontransparent nature of the revenue system.
Eaualization Properties
76.  Income distribution issues also arise because of the design of the
present system of intergovrnmental relations.  Income inequalities appear to
have increased between rich and poor provinces in China, and may have been
accentuated by fiscal decentralization which benefits better-off provinces
through increased local tax retention powers.  In many countries, the fiscal
system is pointed toward reducing income differences among provinces, the goal
being to raise the poorer provinces' fiscal capacities and per capita expen-
ditures, so that the inhabitants of rich and poor provinces receive a more
comparable level of services.  In many countries, equity is promoted by grants
or transfers specifically targeted to poor areas, as distinct from transfers
directed at achieving vertical balance.
77.  China's revenue-sharing system does not appear to go very far towards
equalizing per capita expenditures.  A major reason is the inherent conflict
between equity and incentives for revenue collection which have led to low
contract quotas, the benefits of which accrue to better-off provinces.  The
objective of equity would be served if better-off provinces remitted more in
order to transfer greater amounts to poor provinces.  The government has not
yet faced up to this inherent conflict in designing the current system.  In
fact, one could make the argument that the current system is intended to
enable provinces to maintain a historical, benchmark level of expenditures,
which were themselves unequally distributed in the first place.  The result is
that greater emphasis has been given to stimulating tax effort and to
supporting historical levels of expenditure than to promoting interprovincial
fiscal equalization.
78.  A hypothetical example (see  Box 3) illustrates that, although the reve-
nue-sharing system in China makes net transfers to poorer provinces, these do
not go far towards equalizing fiscal capacities between richer and poorer
17/  There is a similarly low capital expenditure share in the extrabudgetary
accounts, suggesting a similar effect at work.  See also Remy Prud'homme:
"Urban Finances in Shanghai," IBPD  mimeo, for a discussion of urban and
local financing reforms.- 26 -
Box  3: EQUALIZATION  PROPERTIES  OF  CHINA'S  PROVINCIAL  CONTRACTING
China's  present  revenue-sharing  system  involves  Central-Provincial  contracts  of  three  types:  (i)
for  high-  and  middle-income  provinces,  the  center  requires  a  "quota',  delivery  and  applies  a  zero  or
near-zero  above-quota  sharing  rate  on  above-quota  collections,  to  provide  coLlection  incentives  where
taxabte  capacity  is  greatest;  (ii)  for  some,  mostly  middle-income,  provinces,  there  is  "aroPortional
sharjnM,"  in  which  the  same  sharing  rate  is  applied  both  to  the  quota  collections,  and  above-quota
collections.  This  has  been  mostly  phased  out  now  and  replaced  with  a  simple  "fixed  auota  delivery  as  in
the  high  income  provinces;n  and  (iii)  a  lump-sum  transfer  is  given  to  most  poor  provinces.
An  important  question  is  whether  this  approach  helps  to  equalize  expenditure  capacities  in  the
various  provinces.  The  example  below  explains  this  in  a  hypothetical  case.  The  simulation  tracks  the
growth  in  expenditure  capacity  (i.e.,  the  amount  that  the  local  governments  are  able  to  spend)  under
this  system  over  a  3-year  period  in  which  revenues  are  assumed  to  grow  by  20  percent  annually.  Provin-
cial  expenditure  capacity  is  defined  as  collections,  plus  or  minus  the  transfers  to/from  the  central
government.  The  transfer  to  deficit  provinces  is  assumed  to  be  Y  50,  fixed  for  five  years.
The  simulations  show  that:  (i)  in  the  deficit  provinces  that  retain  all  revenues  collected  and
receive  a  fixed  transfer,  expenditure  capacity  grows  the  slowest;  (ii)  in  provinces  where  proportional
(25  percent)  contracting  applies,  expenditure  capacity  grows  at  the  same  rate  as  revenues  (20  percent);
and  (iii)  under  the  fixed-quota  contract,  expenditure  capacity  grows  faster  than  collections.  By
implication,  the  richer  (high  tax  yield)  provinces'  expenditure  capacity  grows  far  faster  than  the
deficit  provinces  that  receive  direct  transfers.  At  the  end  of  year  3,  the  expenditure  capacity  under
the  fixed  contract  system  has  grown  by  nearly  60  percent;  that  under  proportional  sharing  by  44  percent;
and  that  of  the  transfer  recipients,  by  nearly  30  percent.
Box  Table  1: HYPOTHETICAL  EFFECTS  OF  REVENUE  SHARING




to/from  Expenditure  capacity
Collections  center  capacity  (En  +  E.)
Exam  le  1: Deficit  Province
(Receives  Fixed  Nominal  Transfer),
Year  1  100  +50  150  100
Year  2  120  +50  170  113
Year  3  144  +50  194  129
Examtle  2: Prooortional
Contract  (25X  sharing)
Year  1  200  -50  150  100
Year  2  240  -60  180  120
Year  3  288  -72  216  144
Examnle  3: Contract  System
(Pays  25X  of  Base  Year  Collections.
Fixed  In  Nominal  Terms)
Year  1  200  -50  150  100
Year  2  240  -50  190  128
Year  3  288  -50  238  158
provinces. If,  in addition,  the  poorer  provinces  cannot  or do not  make  the
same  tax  effort  as  better-off  prov 4.nces,  the  disparity  in  budgetary  revenues
available  would  be even  wider.  (See  Annex  2 for  a formal  treatment  of the
counterequalizing  effects  of the  system.) China's  actual  experience  shows
that  expenditures  in  China's  richer  provinces  grew faster  than in  the  poorer
ones,  and  per  capita  expenditures  in  better-off  provinces  are  also
significantly  higher  (Annex  Tables  4 and  6).- 27 -
79.  For a tax-sharing system to be effective in equalization, it must first
identify what is to be equalized, and then it must find some objective
measures to allocate resources to achieve these objectives.  Indicators of
interregional differences and/or economic status must be made explicit in
the allocation criteria of the transfers.  For example, in Brazil and India
(two countries with wide regional disparities) some 50 percent of the funds
allocated among the states are based on "indicators of need."  Indonesia and
Malaysia use other even more detailed indicators of need, such as an index of
physical infrae_ructure (road and transport network, etc.) and social
infrastructure (schools, hospitals, etc.), per-capita income and
population.18/
C.  OPTIONS FOR REFGRM
80.  The economic system reform requires a change in the roles of central and
local governments in China.  China needs an intergovernmental system which:
o  is consistent with maintaining an appropriate income elasticity of
revenues
O  provides incentives for public infrastructure development;
o  which supports central government macroeconomic management;
O  will influence resource allocation in line with national goals and
priorities;
O  will promote income distribution goals; and, most importantly,
o  supports and is consiatent with system reforms such as price and
enterprise reforms.
Some Alternatives
81.  The foundations are now bein7 laid for a reform of the intergovernmental
fiscal system, and a number of spetcific  measures have recently been
considered.  While a decision was made in the December 1990 Plenum of the
Communist Party to retain the present system for another five years (i.e.,
through 1995), the present system is not fully adequate for either level of
government and fiscal reform remains a very live discussion.
82.  Several different fiscal reform proposals either are under discussion in
government or have been considered in the past.  These are:
0  Strengthening the local tax base by designating more taxes as strictly
local and not subject to sharing;
0  The reassignment of certain taxes (responsibility for both policy and
administration) to the central government, and others to the local
government;
O  A local surcharge on the national government profits or sales taxes;
O  Continued revenue sharing with a reduction of provincial sharing rates
to increase local tax effort, supported by an equalizing transfer
eystem.
18/  A survey of formula tranqfers is included in Roy Bahl and Johannes Linn
Urban Public Finance in Developing Countries, Oxford University Press,
forthcoming.- 28  -
O  Continued revenue sharing with an increase in the provincial sharing
rates to increase central revenues, accompanied by a transfer system.
O  A  more piecemeal reform of the oresent  system.
83.  There is no easy choice among these models.  Certainly one could not look
to the experience elsewhere in the world to find one system that works best.
Aiternative structures of intergovernmental finance differ widely among
countries, and the "right" choice depends on political considerations,
regional differences, constitutional requirements and administrative
c&pabilities.  The most basic issues that differentiate systems are the
command of each level of government over fiscal resources, and the resultant
independence in spending these resources.
84.  Whatever the tax assignment between levels of government, fiscal
transfers are usually required to get a better correspondence between revenue-
raising capacity and expenditure needs.  "Vertical balance" of revenues and
expenditures--the  amount  raised  and  the  amount  spent  at  each  level  of
government--is  seldom  perfect,  and  it  ought  not  to  be,  for  several  reasons:
first, central governments (particularly in developing countries) have a
decided advantage in revenue raising.  However, many expenditures are better
planned and delivered by the local level,  where local preferences can be
considered and the service can be better "fitted"  to the local situation.  For
this reason alone, intergovernmental transfers are needed.  A second
justification for intergovernmental transfer is to finance services with
"externalities,"  such  as those  which  contribute  to meeting  national  health  or
education objectives, and those where purely local financing could lead to
underprovision from a regional or national perspective.  Third is the
equalization issue.  with wide variations in resource endowments, intergov-
ernmental compensating transfers may have a redistributive role to play among
regions.  There also is a political motive.  Intergovernmental transfers allow
the central government .o maintain control over rG'venues--depending  on how the
grant system is designed--while delegating expenditure delivery responsibility
to local governments.  For all of these reasons, one would expect to find
intergovernmental transfers as part of the fiscal system in all but the
smallest and most centralized countries.19/  Box 4 outlines some
international experience with different systems.
Box  4:  FISCAL  FEDERALISMS  AND CENTRALIZED  SYSTEMS
More countries  are organized as  unitary  than  as  federal  systems.  Under  a  unitery  system,  there  is
not  a  legal  statement of  the  powers and responsibilities  of  subnational  governments, and provincial
government  fiscal  powers  are  given  through  direct  central  regulation.  The  important  issue  here  is
"fiscaL  autonomy,"  the  control  over  sufficient  resources  to  plan  and  manage  the  provision  of  local
public  services  without  continuous  interference  and  control  by  higher  level  authorities.  The  size  of
local  government  (expenditure)  and  the  revenues  of  local  govermnent  are  important  indicators.  However,
the  degree  of  autonomy  may  also  be  defined  by: (a)  whether  there  is  latitude  in  revising  tax  rates  and
bases;  (b)  whether  borrowing  powers  are  circumscribed;  (c)  whether  the  local  bidget  is  subject  to  higher
level  approval  and  monitoring;  and  (d)  whether  the  local  officials  are  appointed  by  a  higher  level  gov-
errment.
Evidence  suggests  that  there  is  considerable  divergence  on  the  exoenditure  side  from  country  to
country.  On  the  whole,  local  governments  in  most  OECD  countries  and  responsible  for  the  delivery  of
most  direct  services  to  citizens,  such  as  primary  and  secondary  education,  health,  social  welfare,
housing,  and  the  provision  of  local  services  such  as  street  repair,  refuse  removal,  and  the  like.  Local
goverrnments  in  many  developing  countries  have  similar  responsibilities  but  more  often  the  central
government  tekes  a  Larger  role,  with  overlapping  functions  in  some  cases.
19/  This is also true in the U.S. where federal grants to state and local
government expenditures account for 16 percent of total state and local
government revenues and 10 percent of total federal government
expenditures.- 29  -
Box 4:  F.-CAL FEDERALISMS  AND  CENTRALIZED  SYSTEMS  (Continued)
The size  and pattern  of  local  government  revenues also  varies  greatly  from country  to  country.  One
common  element,  however, is  that  in  no country  do local  taxes  come  close  to  financing  local  expenditures.  In
nine  (European) countries  for  which  information  is  availabLe,  Local  taxes accounted on average for  41 percent
of  local  revenue in  1988.  Non-tax revenue (such as user  charges) for  .O  percent and grants  for  39 percent.
There is  also  considerable  variation  from country  to  country  in  the  role  of  grants:  in most countries  grants
include  both  general grants,  often  with  an explicit  equalization  element,  and  specific  grants  of  many
varieties.
Local  goverriment  authority  to  adjust  tax  rates  and to  enact new  taxes  is  limited  in  most countries,  but
is  more limited  in  developing  countries.  In  general,  the  national  or  state  law prescribes  the  tax bases
availabLe  (or  unavaiLable)  to  local  goverrvnents  and sets  maximum  rates  within  which local  goverrunents  must
operate.  These restrictions  usually  hold even for  the  largest  cities.  When  the  rate  ceilings  are binding,
Local governments  have little  revenue discretion  and are dependent on the  higher  level  government for
approval  of  every  revenue proposal.  A  similbr  arrangement holds  for  the  adju:.ting  of  user  charges for  most
major services,  e.g.,  water rates,  bus fares,  rents.  The issue  then becomes  whether or not  the  approving
central  or  state  goverrnent  will  permit  the  requested increases  in  rates  and charges.  Experience varies  but
some  countries  have consistently  refused requests  for  local  rate  increases,  e.g.,  cities  in  Bangladesh  have
been held  at  1960 property  tax  rates  despite  repeated requests  for  increments.  All  countries  are not  subject
to  sJch stringent  controls.  Brazil  and Venezuela  are among  the  exceptions  in  that  municipal  laws are not
subject  to  approval  by higher  level  goverrinents,  though some  tax  changes  do require  approval  by a central
agency.
A number  of  conclusions  are  suggested by  th^  range of  outcomes  sketched above.  First,  national
governments  clearly  exercise  considerable  discreticn  in  deciding  how large  a role  local  governments  play,  the
extent  to  which local  activities  are  financed  from local  revenues, and the  types of  taxes  levied  by  local
governments.  Chart  1 below shows, for  a variety  of  countries,  the  relative  importance of  the  subnationat
fiscal  sector  in  overal  national  finance,  and the  degree of  fiscal  autonomy  which the  sector  has,  as
measured  by the  importance of  its  "own revenues" in  total  spending.  The size  of  the  subnational  sector  in
China, at  45X,  is  not  insignificant.  With respect  to  the degree of  revenue autonomy, formally  defined,
China's  subnational  governments  are  retatively  revenue dependent, with  own-source revenues only  11 percent  of
their  total  revenues.  This compsres  with  the  subnational  sector  in  countries  such as Korea, and Indonesia,
which are also  large  in  the  overall  financial  picture  but  are  not  self-financing.  De facto,  China's
localities  are,  conparatively,  much  more revenue independent than these most.  At  the  other  extreme are
countries  such as ChiLe, Kenya  and Sri  Lanka, whose  subnational  governments, inportance  in  the  overall  fiscal
picture  is  small,  but  which are  self-financing.
Chart  1:  Subnational  Finance:  Revenue  Independence  and
Scale of  Subnational  Sector
Subnational  government  spending
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Source:  R. Baht and J.  Linn,  op.  cit,  and R. Bird  and C. Wallich;  "Local  Goverrwnent  Finance in  Hungary"
World Bank  Working Paper,  forthcoming;  Chart source:  1988 WDR,  World Bank.- 30 -
Principles of Tax Sharina and Tax Assignment
85.  There is no ideal assignment of taxes between central and local
governments.  However, there is general agreement that responsibility for
setting the rate and base of certain tax sources is more appropriats for local
governments and while for other taxes, the national government should have
such responsibility.  These principles of "tax assignment" relate to the
respective responsibilities of central and local governments in resource
allocation, income redistribution, and macroeconomic stabilization and growth.
In developing countries there is the issue of the administrative capabilities
of local governments; in large and diverse countries there is an issue of tax
harmonization; and in China, there is the added dimension of compatibility of
the state-local system with China's economic reforms.
86.  The stabilization-growth objective of the government fiscal system
clearly calls for central control over the money supply and most debt
management.  Taxes on international trade and a substantial share of income
and general sales taxes should also reside with central governments.  The
central government must have the tax instruments to deal with a  central
deficit or with inflation.  This does not mean that local governments should
not have access to sales or income taxes.  Rather it means that the assignment
of these taxes between levels of government should recognize the need for the
central government to use tax policy in controlling the macroeconomy.  Where
local governments do have taxes with stabilization properties, stabilization
policy may be made more difficult if local government expenditure policy
conflicts with the center's stabilization objectives.  The converse of this is
that central governments can tive  with more unstable sources of revenue
because they can borrow to maiize  up the shortfall.  Local governments, by
contrast, require relatively etable sources of revenue.
87.  There are "special" taxes that ought to be assigned to the central
government, if they are at the center of national policy.  The tax on motor
fuels, and perhaps that on major natural resource-based exports, are examples.
88.  If the assignment of taxing powers were to be made solely on a basis of
macroeconomic control considerations, local governments would not have access
to any of the broad-based taxes.  But government also has an allocative
function, i.e., it decides on how much of national (local)  resources shall be
spent on which government-provided goods.  Here local governments should play
a greater role, it can be argued, because they are closer to the people and
better able to take the pulse of the local population for public services.
The efficiency argument for local government revenue raising powers would be
based on the types of local services delivered:
O  general purpose local services whose benefits do not spill across
local boundaries should be financed by general purpose local taxes;
O  services that are locally delivered and can be "priced," e.g., public
utilities, should be financed with user chzrges; and
O  services with benefit spillovers should be financed either directly by
the central government or via revenue shariny.
The Chinese system does not even approximate these norms, indicating that
efficiency considerations play little role in the assignment of functions to
local governments.
89.  In China, there are other important efficiency considerations that pull
the assignment of taxing power toward centralization.  It is important that
the fiscal system accommodate the enterprise restructuring through mergers,
conglomerates, joint ventures or joint stock companies.  This suggests, a
priori, that enterprise income taxes should be central government taxes.  To- 31 -
The Chinese system does not even approximate these norms, indicating that
efficiency considerations play little role in the assignment of functions to
local governments.
89.  In China, there are other important efficiency considerations that pull
the assignment of taxing power toward centralization.  It is important that
the fiscal system accommodate the enterprise restructuring through mergers,
conglomerates, joint ventures or joint stock companies.  This suggests, a
priori, that enterprise income taxes should be central government taxes.  To
the extent that price reforms generate major shifts in value added across
provinces, a case can be made for centralizing a portion of the VAT, and using
its proceeds to offset these effects, at least until the transition is largely
complete.
90.  There are also equalization norms that can be used to guide the decision
about which taxes should be local and which should be central.  The
distributive function of government would seem to be an argument for a
centralized taxing system in China.  If there are wide disparities in income
and wealth across provinces, as there are in China, then local taxing powers
can exacerbate these disparities.  Central taxing powers coupled with an
equalizing distribution of transfers can partially offset these disparities,
as can the subsidization of "priceable" public services.  The present
situation in China is one where such equalization has been an important part
of the system, but where the present trend is in the direction of less
equalization through the fiscal system.
91.  The  capacity  to administer  taxes  is always  an important  constraint  to the
assignment of taxing powers in low income countries.  If local governments
cannot effectively aseess and collect the taxes, then the system will tend
toward centralization.  This is not an issue in China because the tax system
is already administered by the local government sector.  In fact, the
administrative question in China is whether the central government is able to
effectively control and monitor the local tax administration syetem.  The
present situation is one of de facto local government taxing powers because
the central government is unable to control the local administration (or
because it has chosen not to).
92.  A final consideration is tax harmonization.  There are certain taxes that
simply ouaht to be central because it is too difficult to try and harmonize
them acrolss  provinces.  The two  most important examples are customs duties and
company income taxes.  In the former case, the revenue would accrue to the
entry province, or every province would levy an .ntry tax on commerce.20/
Neither are workable alternatives.  In the case of company income taxes, the
problem with allowing provinces to levy separate rates is how to assign the
tax base and therefore revenues to each province.211  In China there is the
special problem of how to compensate for firms whose profits are a result of
national subsidy.  Box 5 summarizes one poss.ble approach to tax assignment.
93.  The conclusion from this discussion is that there is no "best"  way to
divide taxation responsibility between the central and local governments.  The
20/  Indian cities levy such a tax, known as "octroi."  It is charged against
all products entering or passing through the corporate boundaries of a
city. It is revenue productive but widely criticized for being disruptive
to interstate trade and corrupt in its administration.
21/  U.S. states levy separate company income taxes, and divide the taxable
base for multistate firms according to a complicated three factor
formula.  In Switzerland, local jurisdictions (the  cantons) are allowed
to levy corporate income taxes as well as personal income taxes and
natural resource taxes.- 32 -
Box  5: PCINCIPLES  OF  TAX  ASSIGNMENT
The  table  below  outlines  one  possible  arrangement  of  tax  assignments  that  derives  from  the
principles  Just  outLined.  As  shown  in  the  table,  taxes  usuatly  tevied  at  the  national  level  inctude
resource  taxes  and  personal  income  taxes.  Customs  duties  are  also  almost  aLways  national-tevel  taxes
because  of  their  strategic  importance,  as  are  resource  and  income  taxes  because  of  their  important  role
in  stabitization  and  distribution  policy.  In  theory,  customs  duties  and  income  taxes  coutd  be  Levied  at
uniform  rates  in  all  localities  with  the  same  resutt,  but  this  woutd  be  harder  to  administer.  Sales
taxes  are  often  thought  to  be  best  levied  at  the  provincial  level,  If  the  region  is  big  enough  to  avoid
revenue  loss  from  consumers  shopping  across  the  border  in  provinces  with  tower  taxes.  The  revenue
growth  from  sales  taxes  is  usually  stable.  Excises  and  surcharges  are  also  appropriate  as  provinciat
taxes.
Box  Table  1: TAX  ASSIGNMENT
Centrat  level  taxes  Provincial  and  Local  taxes
Personat  income  tax  Surcharges  /a
Corporate  income  tax  Sates  taxes
Natural  resource  taxes  Excises
Excises  Property  Taxes
Customs  duties  User fees charges
Surcharges La
/a  Preferabty  at  rates  standardized  across  localities  to  avoid
inequities  across  regions  and  distortion  of  prices.
The  actual  practice  of  tax  assigrvnent  does  not  aLways  parallet  the  above  principles.  For  exanple,
in  Switzerland  and  the  United  States,  tocaL  jurisdictions  (the  cantons  and  states)  are  atlowed  to  levy
corporate  income  taxes  ap  well  as  personal  income  taxes  and  natural  resource  taxes.
case for centralization is usually built around macroeconomic considerations
and equalization, and the case for local government taxing powers around
efficiency considerations.  The "best" way to do thingr depends on how the
goverinment  weights these considerations.  In China, the weighting has come
out, de jure, in favor of a very centralized system, i.e., provincial and
local governments have very little tax policy autonomy.  It might be argued
that the present arrangement is too centralized for China at its present stage
of development and the time is now right to grant more local autonomy.
94.  As noted above, there are several problems with the current Chinese
version of fiscal centralization.  First, local government revenues are
procyclically unstable, while those of the center are too fixed.  Second,
local governments' free hand in the implementation of tax policy e..ables  them
to effect major changes in the incentive structure facing economic agents.
Third, most local financing is from shared taxes, and the present sharing
formulae are moving away from equalization of interprovincial expenditure
capacity.  Finally, the present system complicates price reforms, because of
its revenue impact on different provinces (there  would be major gainers and
losers), and interferes with enterprise reforms in that new organizational
modes such as joint ventures or mergers, especially across taxing
jurisdictions, are effectively discouraged.
Considerations in Weiahing the Options
95.  The major questions to be faced up to in evaluating the choices for
fiscal decentralization are whether local governments will take on more
responsibility for financing local services (in  particular, whether local- 33  -
governments will be given some degree of revenue-raising autonomy); whether
tax administration can remain a local government responsibili.ty;  and whether
the intergovernmental transfer system should include a formula-based transfer
program.
96.  The six models under discussion each have differing implications for
consistency with and support to reforms, stabilization policy, equalization
potential, resource allocation, tax administration, and the extent and nature
of the autonomy given to provinces.  Their pros and cons are evaluated in turn
in the following section and summarized in Box 7.  Whatever model is chosen,
or even if the present system is essentially retained, thero must be provision
for (i)  the institution of new methods of infrastructure financing,
(ii) improved fiscal planning, and (iii) a strengthening of the local tax
administration.
Options
(i)  Option 1:  Tax Reassiqnment:  A Centralized Version
97.  Reassignment of taxing authority--giving local governments the power to
introduce their own taxes and to set tax rates--is one reform possibility that
would fit the objectives outlined above:  it could raise more revenue and, if
tax rates can be set by localities rather than by central mandate, it could
make local officials more accountable to their populations for the quality of
services delivered.  Successfully implemented, it could stimulate the tax
collection of local governments.  This approach, applied in its extreme form,
would call for fully separate central and local taxes, and an end to the
shared tax system.  The three questions to resolve would be:  which taxes to
give to each level of government, how to administer the center's taxes (since
they are currently collected by local governments), and how to design an
appropriate transfer system.
98.  One possibility, call it "Version A", is a very centralized approach
under which the enterprise income tax and the product, businese, and value-
added taxes would become fully central revenues.  Provincial governments would
be given minor taxes (e.g., the 13 "fixed local taxes" assigned to them in
1985) and allowed to introduce new local taxes and user charges.  There would
be separate central and subnational tax administrations because local
governments would be unlikely to aggressively collect central taxes in which
they do not receive a share.
99.  If provincial and local governments were given only the minor taxes, they
would be unable to finance all services for which they are now responsible.
One response to this mismatch would be for the central government to assume
direct responsibility for provision of certain services.  This option is not
in keeping with the tenets of system reform and increased decentralization;
the adju;stment  costs would be very great; and, moreover, China is simply too
large and diverse a country for a centralized public expenditure system to be
managed efficiently.  A more likely solution is to allow local governments
some additional taxes and to create a regular program of central grants to
rake up the revenue shortfall.  The grant could be distributed on a formula
basis, with the elements of the formula chosen to reflect provincial income,
or need (see  below).  For example  the grant distribution among provinces
might be based on some combination of per capita income level, population
size, some  indicator of infrastructure needs, urbanization, etc.
100. A very great advantage of this centralized version of tax assignment is
the flexibility that it gives to the central government to influence
interregional equalization and the sectoral composition of investment.  It
also puts the government in a better position to use the tax system for
macrostabilization goals.  And, because it merges responsibility for tax
structure and tax administration, the tax system can be used to achieve- 34 -
allocative goals.  The latter point is especially important:  the tax "levers"
that the central government designed would be more effective.  This option--
since the center would receive all profits and sales taxes--would also reduce
the fiscal impact of price reforms and make changes  in enterprise
organizational forms irrelevant to provincial government finances.  The
biggest disadvantages to this approach are the loss of provincial and local
control over revenues, the reduced incentive for revenue mobilization by local
governments, and the increased expense associated with two separate tax
administration machineries and with the maintenance and operation of a grant
system.
101. This approach is used by most low-income countries that have unitary
forms of government, but it  may not be feasible for China.  There are few
local taxes currently in place, and together they account for 19 percent of
total taxes collected, 9  percent of provincial and local expenditures, and
about 1.5 percent of GNP in 1985 (see  Table 5).22/  To increase the local
tax share significantly beyond this would imply allowing local governments to
introduce new taxes with significant revenue potential (see  below) or making a
formal reassignment of one or more major taxes to the local governments
[discussed as Option (ii) below], qlternatives  which do not seem likely.
102. Of the various options for increasing local revenue-raising powers, the
land use tax is prominently mentioned.  The rationale for levying this tax is
straightforward.  Since land owned by the state has a location value, it is
appropriate to charge for its use, and to charge accordins,  to its location so
aa to avoid the overuse of land relative to other factors of production.  The
problem with a larj-use tax lies less with its justification in a socialist
economy than with its imple.nentation. Valuing property and location value is
difficult when there is no formal market in which land is bought and sold.
Similar'.y,  taxes may not induce a better use of  arban  land when enterprise
location mobility is very limited.  The adequacy of the existing cadastre and
the problems of recordkeeping are additional issues.  Finally, there is the
question of the land tax's revenue potential.  Unless levied at a high rate,
it is unlikely to have any significant revenue impact or to influence
decisions; however, a high rate may not be feasible due to constraints or lags
in other system (e.g.,  price) reforms.23/
103. User charges can generate more local resources, cover the cost of
services, and charge users for benefits received.  Transport, water supply,
gas and housing are each frequently cited as important services where present
charges are nominal.  While at first glance, increased user charges might seem
to be a way of financing certain services, the situation in China is more
complicated, and it is not clear how large a revenue boost there would be.
Increased user charges would lower the profitability of consuming enterprises
and thereby profits tax revenue, since services are tax-deductible costs.
This would be partially, but not completely, offset by an increase in sales
and profits tax revenues from the public utility enterprise, since public
utilities are typicalXy taxed at preferential rates.  Localities may well
receive a net reduction in revenues if public utility user charges are
increased.  However, it also could be that, where government subsidies to the
utilities have been necessary, increased user charges will relieve some pres-
22/  The "13 own taxes" are the Urban Maintenance and Construction Tax (UMCT),
vehicle utilization tax, the profits tax on collectives, land occupancy
tax, vehicle tax, house tax, slaughter tax, animal trading tax, free-
market transaction tax, salt tax, agriculture tax and local vehicle
utilization tax.
23/  For a detailed discussion of the land tax use in China, see Roy Bahl and
Jun Zhang, mimeo, World Bank, 1988, "Land Use Taxes in China."- 35 -
sure on the general local budget.  In short, the net impact of increased user
charges in the local government budget is not at all clear.
(ii)  Tax ReassiLnment:  Decentralized Version
104. Another approach (call it "Version B") would reassign to local
governments one or more if the productive tax bases, such as the sales or
profits tax.  This would provide sufficient or nearly sufficient revenues for
the higher income provinces, and only an equalizing supplementary grant scheme
would be necessary.  This solution would give provincial governments a
considerable amount of discretion in determining the level of revenues and
expenditures, and would increase the economic decision making role of local
governments.  There is precedent for this more decentralized approach.  The
assignment of broad provincial and local taxing powers can be found in large
countries such as the United States, Brazil, Colombia and Nigeria, where state
and local governments raise 25 to 50 percent of all taxes.
105. The major issue is the choice or taxes to hand over to subnational
governments.  In practice, the central government is unlikely to give up
either of the two major taxes, and it is not at all clear that it should.  The
sales tax is the major revenue producer in China and will almost certainly not
be decentralized, although it would be a good candicate for this.  Most
central governments levy a general sales tax (the  United States is the most
notable exception), though many share the proceeds with subnational gov-
ernments.24/  The profits tax would be a good choice in that it is revenue-
productive, but, as a purely local government revenue, it would raise a number
of problems.  Local budgets would be at the mercy of the typically cyclical
behavior of profits and the impact of central government macroeconomic, price
and wage policy on the tax base.  Local governments whose enterprises continue
to be affected by central price controls would be sorely disadvantaged.
Moreover, the assignment of the profits or product taxes to provinces would
lead them to be very unequally affected by system reform.  Price reforms that
affected, say, intermediate goods-producing provinces would benefit them vis-
a-vis user-provinces.  Full local retention of the profits tax could continue
to discourage new corporate forms, until rules for the sourcing of profits
across business units are devised.
106. The second major issue is determinirg the required revenue base.  This
requires, first, clarifying the expenditure responsibility of the central and
local governments, respectively.  In China, these responsibilities are not
clearly separated; and the issue of revenue adequacy cannot be discussed
separate from expenditure responsibility.  The assignment of the profit or
sales tax to local government would almost certainly require separate central
and local administrations, requiring duplicate audits, reporting requirements,
and the loss of economies of scale in tax administration.
107. Finally, this option would be counterequalizing, in that the highest
income provinces would generate the greatest amounts of revenue.  For
disadvantaged communities, a program of compensating grants will be required.
The challenge is to design a compensation program that will equalize, but not
dampen the incentive to mobilize local revenues.  As the experience in many
countries will i  test, designing and implementing such a system is difficult.
24/  Note that if the VAT were made into a provincial tax, rates would have to
be uniform in all provinces to avoid special administrative problems.- 36 -
(iii)  The "Local Surcharge" or Tax Base Sharinq Option
108. As an alternative to reassigning taxes or allowing localities to levy new
taxes, localities could be given the option of "surtaxing" the present
national taxes at a prescribed higher (local)  rate.  This model involves a
sharing of the tax base, and is fundamentally different from a reassigmnent of
taxing power.  Provincial governments would be permitted to levy (withLn a
range) a surtax rate on the enterprise, product, business, and/or value-added
taxes.  In the case of the enterprise tax, a basic rate (say 35 percent
instead of the present 55 percent) would belong to the central government;
provincial governments could levy an additional rate of up to, say, a maximum
of 20 percent.  Alternatively, the subnational tax might be levied as a
percentage of the central tax liability, in much the same way as the present
UCMT is now calculated as a percent of sales tax liability.  (Box 6
illustrates how a local surcharge might work).  The UCMT offers an interesting
precedent for this approach, differing from the proposal here only in that the
surtax rate is fixed by the central government.
109. Whether revenues under this option would be adequate to meet provincial
expenditure needs depends on how the surtax limits are set.  If, on average,
rates were set to reflect expenditure needs (again,  these would have to be
defined), higher-income provinces could generate adequate revenues but the
lower-income provinces could not.  Equalizing formula grants would be required
to compensate for the low fiscal capacity of some provinces.  If local tax
administration is retained under a ba"e-sharing program, provincial and local
governments coula not be permitted to .'ngage  in any tax relief policies that
would affect the ba-a or rate of the ce'tral government tax.  If provincial
governments chose z3  provide tax prefereices, this could be done only by
reducing their own tax base or surcharge -ate.  The effect of this principle
is illustrated in the two cases in Box 6 balow.
Box  6: PROFIT  AND  SALES  TAX  SHARING  UIDER  A  BASE-SHARING  MODEL
The  simple  numerical  exanpte  here  describes  one  version  of  how  an  enterprise  would  be  treated
under  such  a  system.  The  central  -ales  and  profits  tax  rates  are  assumed  to  be  10  and  20  percent,
respectively,  and,  to  make  matters  b;mple,  the  tax  bases  are  gross  sales  and  gross  profits,  respec-
tively.  In  case  A,  the  provincial  government  chooses  rates  of  5  and  15  percent,  with  no  preferential
treatments,  with  the  result  that  it  collects  Rmb  950  from  this  enterprise  by  comparison  with  Rmb  1,600
for  the  centraL  goverrment.
Case  A  Case  B
Gross  Sales  (Rmb)  10,000  10.000
Central  sales  tax  at  10X  1,000  1,000
Provincial  sales  tax  at  5X  500
Provincial  sales  tax  at  3X  - 300
Less  Production  Expenses  5,500  5,500
Eouals  Gross  Profits  (Rmb)  30  3.000
Central  profits  tax  at  20X  a/  600  600
Provincial  profit  tax  at  15X  450  -
Provincial  profit  tax  at  10X  - 320
Total  Central  Revenue  (Rnb)  1.600  1.600
Total  Local  Revenue  (Rmb)  950  620
In  case  B,  the  provincial  govermnent  offers  a  preferential  treatment  to  this  enterprise  and  limits  the
sales  and  profits  tax  rates  to  3  and  10  percent,  respectively.  Central  revenues  would  not  be  affected,
Rmb  1,600  is  still  raised  in  Case  B.  but  local  revenues  would  be  reduced  to  Rmb  620  because  of  the  tax
abatement.
YWe  make  the  assumption  that  provincial  and  local  government  sales  taxes  would  be  deductible  for
provincial  and  local  income  taxes  but  not  for  central  income  taxes.- 37  -
110. A choice would have to be made as to which taxes to surcharge.  The
sales and profits taxes would be the candidates in China.  One could make
strong arguments for the sales tax:  (a)  a major problem with an income tax
surcharge would be prorating profits between provinces in the case of
multiplant firms; (b) a sales tax would cover more firms (those making profits
as well as those not making profits), hence the financing of local services
would be more broad-based; (c)  more efficient enterprises would not be
penalized with a higher rate of profits tax; and (d) local accounting
practices are such that total sales value can probably be estimated more
accurately than total profits.ZS/ The principal argument in favor of the
profits tax is that it is a better ability-to-pay indicator.
111. Compared to the local tax option and more balanced tax reassignment
models discussed above, this approach implies less central governance of the
tax base and considerably more local fiscal self-determination.  There are
disadvantages to this shared-base approach.  Provinces with a stronger
economic base would have an advantage and the supplementary grant program
would have to be created and maintained.  The local tax administration system
would have to be carefully monitored by a better management information system
(MIS) than presently exists to ensure proper collection of the center's tac
share.  The central government would also give up some control over the tax
system's stabilization and allocative properties at the margin, especially if
the enterprise tax were surtaxed, and therefore would have less leeway in
using tax policy to pursue stabilization and macroeconomic go&ls or to address
allocative objectives.  A major consideration in structuring a surcharge would
be how to recalibrate the system (through  grants or other mechanisms) to
offset the effects of price reforms on fiscal disparities.  To the extent that
provinces continue to generate a major share of revenue from profits tax
surcharges, this could impede enterprise reforms.
112. On the other hand, the surcharge has great advantages over the
alternative of designing and implementing a fully new tax.  The administrative
structure to assess and collect the surcharge is already in place and at the
right rate it can be a substantial revenue producer, and would give local
governments some revenue autonomy.  Compared to a low-yield land tax, a
profits or sales tax surcharge are clearly superior as revenue-raising
measures.  Thus, despite the disadvantages, one might be able to make a good
case that this could be an appropriate approach for China.  It  would allow
provincial governments to continue to use taxes to promote local industrial
policy, while allowing the central government to retain some control over the
level of  taxation and complete control over the definition of the tax base.
This system would give the local governments a significant incentive to
improve the efficiency of their tax administration.  It might also be argued
that, by comparison with the present system, central government macroeconomic
control would not be compromised markedly.
25/  In the case of turnover taxes, the addition of a local surcharge poses
few conceptual or practical difficulties.  An invoice-based VAT could
raise some difficulties.  One problem is that provinces specializing in
intermediate goods would almost certainly prefer to "export" taxes to
other provinces rather than zero-rate their own "exports."  A true
destination VAT would require some kind of adjustment for taxes on
"imported" goods, as will now be the case in EEC countries.  However, it
is doubtful that local governments would wish to give credit for
"foreign" taxes on inputs purchased from other provinces.  While the
experience of VAT harmonization in the European Community offers some
parallels here, it appears unlikely that a regionally rate-
differentiated VAT could operate satisfactorily in China without central
control.  See Tait, Alan, VAT:  International Experiences and Problems,
1986.- 38 -
(iv)  Higher Provincial Retention Rates
113. Another way to increase subnational revenues is simply to change the
sharing formula, i.e., to allow local governments to retain a greater
percentage of what they collect.  The central government is already moving in
this directicn by increasing the marginal retention rates for provinces with a
greater taxable capacity, and by entering into special contracting
arrangements with certain provinces (e.g., Shanghai).  The sharing rate is in
fact used as a policy instrument within provinces, where retention rates for
cities vary widely.  (Low-income cities/counties usually are given a higher
retention, with lower retentions applied to the richer urban areas.)
114. This approach has the strong supports many of China's provincial govern-
ments.  Its effects, however, are uncertain and require further analysis.  On
the positive side, substantial revenues would remain at the local level and
resources available for allocation to local projects would increase.  A
greater local tax share would create a greater sense of local autonomy, and
local officials would have a greater incentive to improve tax administration.
System reform which gives more autonomy to enterprises combined with an
increased sharing rate would reduce the gains from collusion between local
governments and enterprises and would increase overall resource mobilization.
In all of these cases the issue is whether the magnitude of the response would
be significant.
115. Increased local retention also has serious drawbacks.  The central
government could view an increased provincial share as a further drain on its
total revenues.  This would exacerbate the center's budget problem and reduce
its ability to reallocate revenues among provinces.  This proposal would,
therefore, involve a trade-off between encouraging more revenue mobilization
by local governments on the one hand, and lessening the redistribution of
fiscal resources from richer to poorer areas, on the other.  Therefore, it
could well turn out to be a counterequalizing measure.  Finally, inasmuch as
price reforms will affect provinces tax bases, according to whether they are
producing or consuming goods which are liberalized or continue to be subject
to controls, higher local retention will need to be linked with some method of
recalibrating the provincial quotas to offset the impact of price reform on
the revenue base.
(v)  Lower Provincial Retention Rates
116. The obverse approach is the choice of the center.  A lower provincial
retention rate would, it is hoped, give the center more revenue, assuming
localities do not respond by reducing their tax collection efforts.  The
greater revenue base could improve the center's ability to reallocate revenues
among provinces and equalize resources through a grant system.  It could
provide the center with more resources for nationally important investment
projects, or projects spanning several provinces, and would strengthen its
ability to use fiscal policy for stabilization purposes.  The major question
here is whether central revenues would rise, or whether local government
reductions in tax effort would be the dominant impact.  Provincial and local
resistance to this option would be strong.
(vi)  i&eformina  the Present System
117. All of the schemes reviewed above are "big" changes.  They call for
eliminating the existing tax-sharing system, giving local governments some
rate-setting autonomy, creating a grant system, and changing the nature of
responsibility for tax administration.  Another possibility is that reform
will go more slowly, and a decision will be made to eliminate some of the most
objectionable features of the present system while developing its strengths.
Among the advantages of the current system are that its local orientation fits
some of the goals of decentralization.  It recognizes that provincial- 39 -
officials are in a good position to determine how tax relief can best
stimulate the local economy, leaving it to them to decide between tax
contracts to stimulate production, a tax holiday to protect a pioneer
industry, a one-year abatement to help an enterprise through a cash flow
problem, etc.  There is an efficiency case for the ad-hoc approach since each
local government is able to trade between preferential tax treatments and
revenues for general government services.
118. On the other hand, there are arguments against the ad-hoc, decentralized
approach.  First, because local governments can grant tax relief, the present
system probably reduces, rather than increases, general government revenues,
at least in the short run.  Second, its ad-hoc nature produces a very uneven
pattern of effective tax rates across enterprises.  Whether this horizontal
inequity is acceptable depends on the objectives of the local economic plan.
Third, the ad hoc approach interferes with efficient tax administration.
Proliferation of special treatments for enterprises makes the tax system more
complicated and more difficult for local officials to administer.  Moreover,
there is almost certainly some tendency to be lax in assessments when there
are so many possibilities for special treatment.
119. But perhaps the most severe criticism of the ad-hoc approach is that it
destroys the notion of a system of taxation.  The central government
increasingly discusses the pcssibilities of using the tax system as a "lever"
to influence economic activity.  However, if local governments can change the
pattern of effective tax rates without agreeing such changes with higher level
governments, then the intent of using the tax system to influence economic
activity can be defeated.  There is a direct trade-off between the central
government's objectives to indirectly 'nfluence the allocation of resources in
the economy, and decentralization in the form of power to grant tax relief.
120. The central policy question becomes whether it is possible to allow
local governments some revenue powers as an incentive to increase revenue
mobilization and, at the same time, allow them to retain the power to grant
abatements, holidays, and relief through contracts.  To the extent the
government's objective is to create more uniformity in its system, the proper
strategy iB  to move toward eliminating the ad-hoc power of local government to
influence the distribution of effective tax rates.  To the extent
decentralization is more important than the use of taxes as an economic lever,
there might be some argument for a continuation of the present practice.  The
granting of increased taxing powers and a continuation of the present ad-hoc
practices, however, are not compatible.
121. These considerations suggest that, if the current system is to be
"patched up," the areas where reform is most needed are:
O  rationalizing the rates of central-provincial revenue sharing;
O  rationalizing the system of provincial grants;
O  bringing the implementation of central tax policy under control; and
O  modernizing the systam of tax administration and financial
management.
122. The following changes should be made in the system of central-provincial
sharing rates.  First, the trend to fixed nominal quotas should be eliminated,
and a sharing ratio should be determined on some objective basis rather than
in an ad-hoc way.  If one province's retention rate is to be lower than
another's, the difference should be based on objective indicators.  A formula
should be substituted for the present negotiated and judgmental approach.  For
example, the formula might compensate for lower fiscal capacity or greater
fiscal need, or reward greater revenue mobilization (see  next section).- 40 -
Second,  the  tax-sharing  ratios  should  remain  fixed  for  a number  of years  to
provide  local  governments  with some  certainty,  and  to discourage  the sharing
ratio  from  being  a subject  of annual  negotiation. Third,  the  provincial  and
local  governments  should  know  the sharing  ratio  before  the  beginning  of the
fiscal  year,  to ensure  better  fiscal  planning  and  the  realization  of any
incentive  effects.
123.  Additionally,  the  grants  system  should  be rationalized,i.e.,  it should
be made more  regular,  should  have  a known  distribution  formula,  and  should  be
coordinated  with  the shared  tax  system  (see  below). one  possibility  would  be
to set  up a "Grants  Commission"  along  the  lines  of those  in India  and
Australia,  to study  and  recommend  a fixed,  five-year  program  of revenue
sharing. In the  interim,  and  before  price  reforms  are  completed,  the  grants
system  must incorporate  some  objective  compensating  mechanisms  for  the impact
of price  reforms  on provinces  revenue  base.  Finally,  the  enterprise  tax
should  not  be allowed  to accrue  to the  level  of government  owning  the
enterprises. This  interferes  with  merger,  exploitation  of scale  economies  and
other  interjurisdictional  joint  venture.
124.  The  central  government  must also  rationalize  its  delegation  of
administrative  powers  to provincial  governments  through  a  better  monitoring
and  tax information  system. Before  the central  government  can  evaluate  the
costs  and  benefits  of tax relief,  it  must  understand  the  pattern  of taxation
that is  being  applied  and  the  existing  distribution  of effective  rates. At
present,  the central  government  has  no information  system  that can  produce
this information. It  would  be fair  to say  that  the  central  government  does
not  have  a good idea  about  the impacts  of its  overall  system.
125.  Box 7 summarizes  some  pros and  cons  of the  various  options  developed  and
ranks  them  according  to their  effectiveness  in reaching  the  selected
objectives  of stabilization,  equity,  and incentives  for  revenue  mobilization.
Some  form  of tax sharing  or base  sharing  rates  higher  on  most indicators  than
does  reforming  the  present  system,  or simply  changing  the  present  retention
rates.
Other  Essentials  for  Center-Local  Fiscal  Reform
126.  A System  of Transfers. Whatever  the  choice  of a new  intergovernmental
fiscal  system,  it is not  likely  that  the new  revenue  authority  will  match
expenditure  responsibility  for  every  province. There  will be a need  for  some
kind  of intergovernmental  transfer  system. In some  ways this  is a happy
compromise  between  centralization  and  decentralization.  A system  of transfers
permits  central  governments  to retain  control  over  the  taxes  on the  more  pro-
ductive  bases  but it  guarantees  state  or local  governments  a flow  of revenues
and  can  have a significant  impact  on interprovincial  equity. On the other
hand,  transfers  can  make local  governments  less  accountable  for  their  fiscal
decisions  (they  can  increase  spending  without  increasing  taxes);  hence,  there
will  be less  incentive  to improve  local  government  operations  or be innovative
in service  delivery. In  the  case  of China,  special  attention  also  needs  to be
paid  to the impact  of price  reforms  on the  revenue  base of the  different
provinces  and  how  the  transfer  system  can  help  offset  the  impact  the  price
changes  on fiscal  capacity.
127.  With  respect  to allocative  effects,  a transfer  system  should  be
structured  so as to encourage  efficient  management  and  fiscal  planning  by
local  governments. From  this  perspective,  shared  taxes  with  or  without  a
"formula"  distribution  offer  the  best  possibilities  for  designing  a transfer
system  which  enhances  local  fiscal  planning. If  the  transfer  system  is
intended  to influence  budget  priorities,  other  types  of transfers  may  be
better. Partial  cost  reimbursement  grants  which  lower  the relative  price  of
one  government  service  relative  to  others  offer  the  best  possibility  for
stimulating  spending  (teacher  salary  grants  and  public  works  grants  are- 41  -
Box  7: WEIGHING  THE  SIX  OPTIONS  IN  CHINA
The  table  below  summarizes  how  these  approaches  rate  against  t.e  criteria  that  are  generally  used
to  evaluate  an  intergovernmental  fiscal  system.
Box  Table  1: ECONOMIC  EFFECTS  OF  ALTERNATIVE  APPROACHES
Alto-  Reform
Revenue  Macro- cative  com-
mobili-  stabili-  effi-  pati-
Equity  zation  zation ciency  bility
(i)  Tax  reassignment  - "Al  N  /a  L  H  L/N  H
(fi)  Tax  reassignment  - 'B"  L  N/L  L/h.  4  H  N/L
(iii)  Local  surcharge  on  central  taxes  L/N  H  N/L/H  N/H  N
(iv)  Increased  local  retention  rate  L  H/N  L  H  N/L
(v)  Decreased  local  retention  rate  H  La  L/N  H  L  N/H
(vi)  Reforming  present  system  L  L  L  L  L
/a  Equity  impact  depends  on  the  accompanying  transfer  system.
Definitions:
H  = Positive  economic  effects  or  improvement  with  respect  to  present  system.
N  =  Neutral
L  = Negative  economic  effects
Reform  option  (i),  assigning  certain  taxes  to  localities,  has  many  attractions:  St  has  a  neutral
impact  on  the  center's  ability  to  conduct  stabilization  policy  since  local  governments  will  be  assigned
only  minor  taxes.  Compared  to  the  present  system,  the  central  government's  fiscaL  management  position
would  be  stronger.  It  is  Likely  to  encourage  local  government  tax  effort  since  localities  will  retain
aLl  their  revenues,  but,  the  local  adninistration  would  now  have  less  incentive  to  collect  central
taxes,  and  would  likely  have  to  be  replaced  by  a  central  government  administration.  Since  poorer  local
goverrnents  will  have  a  smaller  tax  base,  the  local  tax  option  is  likely  to  be  counterequalizing.  Howe-
ver,  a  transfer  program  could  offset  this. It  is  highly  compatible  with  price  and  enterprise  reforms,
assuming  an  appropriate  transfer  system  is  in  place.
The  decentralized  version  of  the  reassignment  of  taxes,  option  (ii),  could  be  positive  or  negative
from  the  point  of  view  of  macroeconomic  management,  depending  on  which  taxes  are  given  to  the  local
governments.  In  China,  it  is  unlikely  that  the  provinces  will  be  given  access  to  a  major  revenue
source,  hence  the  macroeconomic  management  function  may  not  be  harmed.  On  the  other  hand,  if  important
revenue  sources  are  not  passed  down,  it  is  difficult  to  see  why  provinces  should  improve  tax  effort.
Similarly,  the  increased  self-reliance  of  provinces  suggests  low  equalizing  potential,  unless  the
central  government  simultaneously  introduces  increased  transfers.  This  option  ranks  lower  than  Ci)  on
compatibility  with  reforms.
Option  (iii)  is  neutral  to  low  on  macroeconomic  grounds  depending  on  which  tax  bases  are  surtaxed
and  how  the  enterprise  income  tax  is  administered.  It  must  even  improve  things  to  the  extent  its
introduction  is  coincident  with  a  sharing  out  of  local  tax  concessions  including  contracting.  From  an
equalizing  point  of  view,  however,  its  properties  are  poor  (in  the  absence  of  transfers),  in  that  the
tax  base  in  poorer  provinces  is  likely  to  be  smaller  than  in  better-off  provinces.  From  a  revenue  point
of  view,  the  credentials  of  the  surcharge  option  are  strong,  depending  on  the  latitude  of  the  local
governments  in  rate  determination.  Its  allocative  properties  are  positive  because  local  governments
would  have  more  flexibility  to  choose  a level  of  taxes  and  a level  of  expenditures.  It  is  not  highly
compatible  with  reforms,  unless  contracting  can  also  be  eliminated
Option  (iv)  of  an  increased  local  tax  share  has  appeal  from  the  perspective  of  its  impact  on
revenue  mobilization.  It  rates  low  on  equity.  On  the  stabilization  side,  it  rates  low,  inasmuch  as
provinces  obtain  a  (guaranteed)  larger  share  of  major  taxes.  From  an  allocative  perspective,  the  more
local  control,  the  closer  will  the  local  budget  match  local  preferences,  hence  it  rates  high. It  also
rates  Low  in  terms  of  compatibility  with  reforms.  Option  (v),  reduced  local  retention,  would  have  the
opposite  effects.
Lastly,  there  is  the  reform  of  the  present  system;  its  disadvantages  from  the  perspective  of
revenue  mobilization  and  tax  effort  have  been  described  in  some  detail.  We  have  also  noted  that  its
properties,  from  the  perspective  of  the  central  government,  falls  short  of  what  is  needed  for  sta-
bilization  and  reduces  scope  for  discretionary  central  expenditure  policy  and  equalization.- 42  -
examples of such  programs).  Conditional, earmarked formula grants are another
approach.  Their effectiveness depends on the income elasticity of demand for
the expenditure in question, whether the expenditure would have been made in
any case, and whether local revenues are "fungible."26/
128.  The impact of t-ansfers on tax effort, and the possibility that grants
may affect local revenae mobilization, needs attention in transfer design.
Ideally, one would make the transfers stimulative, so that the transfer has
the net effect of increasing total local government expenditures.  One way to
do this is to build tax effort directly into the allocation formula, so that
governments which exert a relatively greater tax effort, receive a larger
grant.  This has been tried in a number of countries, but without great
success.
129.  An important feature of grants is the extent to which they equalize
fiscal capacities and public service levels.  Typically the objective is to
equalize the expenditure capacity of local governments to finance needed
services.  Usually, full expenditure capacity equalization is not realistic,
since disparities in fiscal capacity are simply too large to be fully offset.
So, most grant systems try and allocate relatively more funds to those areas
that are thought to have the least capacity to finance services, or to those
that have the greatest expenditure needs.  With respect to the former
objective, allocation is usually by formula and relies on some measure of
financial capacity.  In this respect, per capita income figures are an
important ingredient in such revenue-sharing formulae.  Expenditure "needs"
also can guide the distribution of grants, but need is a subjective concept
and most governments have chosen objective proxy measures rather
thansophisticated indicators.  Population is often used as a crude indicator
of needs (i.e., equal per capita allocations of central government assistance
are thought to address variations in needs).  Land area, to reflect the costs
of covering a more dispersed population, and equal shares, to reflect the
fixed costs of government, are common measures.  Some countries try to
allocate special shares to provinces with especially heavier concentrations of
the poor.  It is not clear, however, that any of these approaches has led to
more equalization in the distribution of resources across provinces in
developing countries.  In the last analysis, it has not been possible in most
countries to find satisfactory indicators of capacity and need for inclusion
in the formula.
130.  An important purpose of the grant system is to ensure adequacy of
revenues for local gov3rnments.  "Adequacy" is defined in light of two
considerations:  (i) that transfers be large enough to redress the imbalance
between the revenue bases and expenditure responsibility assigned to local
governments, and (ii)  that transfer revenues should grow at least in
proportion to the growth in local population and prices, i.e., that transfers
allow local governments to hold real per capita expenditures constant.  This,
in turn, depends on:  (a)  how the growth in the pool of funds available for
transfers is determined; (b)  how the distribution among local governments is
made; and (c)  whether the central government actually makes the full monetary
distributions called for by the tranpfer system.  Box 8 outlines some
international experiences with transfers and formula grants.
131.  Finally, until price reforms are completed, the transfer system will
need to address the impact of price reforms on the revenue base of each
province.  In principle, there should be positive and negative offsets, with
some provinces (e.g., intermediates-using, processing provinces) ceribus
paribus receiving higher transfers than other (e.g., intermediates-producing)
provinces.  Empirically, this will require estimates of the revenue base
26/  See Bahl and Linn, Chapter 13, forthcoming; and Shah, A., "Fiscal
Federalism in International Perspective," World Bank Working Paper.- 43  -
Box  8: FORMULA  GRANTS
Four  basic  approaches  to  atlocating  central  revenue  resources  among  tocaL  governments  are:
(i)  tax  sharing,  (ii)  ad-hoc  distributions,  (iii)  reimbursement  of  the  costs  of  specified  undertakings,
and  (iv)  b9  formuta.
Formula  grants  are  popular  because  they  are  objective  and  easily  understood,  and  because  they
give  the  centrat  government  the  opportunity  to  target  the  distribution  of  funds  among  local  governments
in ways  consistent  with  national  policy.  An  added  advantage  is  that  as  local  governments  outgrow  their
needs  for  revenue  sharing,  or  as  their  needs  change  relative  to  other  local  governments,  the  grant  dis-
tribution  is  automatically  adjusted  by  the  formula  and  no  discretionary  government  action  is  catted  for.
Formuta  grants  are  usually  pointed  towards  either  a  recognition  of  variations  in  expenditure
needs  or  of  differences  in  fiscal  capacity,  i.e.,  in  the  ability  to  raise  revenue  while  making  an
average  effort.  Expenditure  needs  are  proxied  in  many  ways  including  per  capita  income,  population,
infrastructure  adequacy,  and  the  like.  The  distribution  of  education  grants  in  Colombia  is  based  pri-
marlty  on  the  population  size  of  each  province.  Philippine  general-purpose  grants  are  distributed
according  to  population  and  land  area.  Transportation  grants  to  Brazilian  state  and  local  governments
are  allocated  according  to  population,  land  area,  and  the  consumption  of  imported  fuels.  The  distri-
bution  of  India's  excise  tax  grant  has  made  use  of  a  poverty  index.  Grants  to  coipensate  some  provinces
for  low-income  and  low-fiscal  capacity  are  often  distributed  partially  by  the  reciprocal  of  per  capita
income.  This  is  done  in  Brazil  and  India.  Yet  other  formula  grant  systems  have  explicitly  included  a
tax  effort  measure  to  induce  provinces  to  increase  their  rate  cf  revenue  mobilization  (examples  are  the
United  States,  Nigeria,  India).
The  disadvantages  to  the  formula  grant  are  that  the  choice  ot  the  grant  elements  can  be  influ-
enced  by  politics.  Moreover,  the  choice  of  a  formula  may  be  limited  to  what  data  are  available,  and  as
such  may  reflect  neither  true  expenditure  need  for  fiscal  capacity.  Moreover,  detailed  and  timely  data
are  almost  never  available  at  the  local  government  leveL.
Source:  Roy  Bahl  and  Johbnnes  Linn;  Urban  Public  Finance  in  Developing  Countries;  forthcoming.
exante,  and the  impact  of the  price  change  on enterprise  profitability  and
retail  sales.
132.  Borrowing  Powers.  Reform  of China's  center-local  system  should  also
address  the  need  to  improve  financing  sources  for  capital  outlays,  which
involve  investment  in long-lasting  infrastructure,  e.g.,  public  utilities  and
road  infrastructure.  Local  governments  in China  make  no use  of borrowing  to
finance  capital  projects.  In most  countries,  local  governments  borrow  to
finance  infrastructure  development.  This  is done  in a variety  of,  albeit
restricted,  ways--bond  finance,  from  a central  government  loan  fund,  from  a
development  bank  capitalized  by the  central  government,  etc.  Usually,  the
central  government  sets  the  terms  of the  loan,  defines  the  acceptable  uses  of
debt  finance  and  controls  the  flow  of  loan  funds.  In the  United  States,  local
governments  have  greater  autonomy  in deciding  how  much  to borrow,  under  what
terms  and  from  whom.
133.  There  is potential  for  local  governments  to carry  debt  in China,  at
least  from  the  point  of view  of adequacy  of repayment  potential  for  long-
lived  projects.  However,  borrowing  powers  need  to be accompanied  by a
substantially  reformed  system  of local  financing--taxes  that  were  more
responsive  to income  growth--and  price  reform  to ensure  benefit  charges  are
able  to  cover  costs  (see  below).
134.  Benefit  Charges.  The  other  financing  possibility  is self-financing,
i.e.,  services  that  are  to be  finan:ed  in part  by  beneficiary  charges.  There
are  many  forms  of benefit  charge,  e.g.,  road  and bridge  tolls,  pollution
charges,  full  cost  recovery  from  public  utility  users.  Indeed,  while  there  is
no  formal  benefit  charge  program  in China,  there  is evidence  of many- 44 -
innovative self-financing schemes.  Many local governments have taken
advantage of particular opportunities to finance capital projects with charges
to beneficiaries, but these seem to have been developed on a case-by-case
basis and there is no common practice.  The time may be right for China to
make increasing use of benefit charges.  Infrastructure needs are acute and
enterprises are willing to pay for capital improvements.  What is needed now
is central government guidance in establishing such programs and encouraging
their use.
135.  Tax administration.  The present system of tax administration will not
support the objectives of China's economic reform.  China's tax structure has
very recently been modernized (a  profits tax and a value-added tax have been
introduced since 1984) but its tax administration has not kept pace.  Tax
administration will become more difficult with the growing number of small
private firms and collectives--which are the hard-to-tax sectors in
China.27/
136.  Without a survey of administrative problems, it is difficult to be
specific about the elements of a reform program.  There are, however, four
general areas for improvement.  The first is personnel policies and training
programs and the development of an adequate number of qualified tax
administrators.  The second relates to the need to adapt the administrative
system to accommodate the changing economic system.  The growing private and
collective sector implies a greater need to identify new tax-paying
enterprises and track their activities, hence the need for a tax-paying
numbering system, more information on transactions, more government attention
to assessment and audit, and computerization.  Third is a reexamination of the
tax system to see whether its complications block effective administration.
It may be that the first step toward better administration is a simplification
of the tax structure.  In particular, it is difficult to imagine that the
present income tax system with its contracting feature could ever be
efficiently administered.
137.  The fourth area is the most difficult to address:  should the
government create for itself a separat.e  central tax administration similar to
that which exists in most countries?  The arguments in favor of this are
strong.  Under the present system, there are inadequate incentives for
aggressive assessment and collection efforts.  A centralized system would
eliminate this problem by taking local governments out of the business of
collecting central government taxes.  Another advantage is that procedures
could be standardized across the country and the processes of manual
preparation, monitoring, and gathering and reporting statistics would all
realize economies of scale.  The central government is more able to bring
specialized technical assistance (including  the development of a computerized
tax information system) to the whole system of tax assessment and collection,
and is in the best position to modernize the tax administration to keep it in
step with the modernization of the tax structure.  It is important that
China's new tax structure be implemented so that it achieves the intended
economic impacts, and that it be implemented in a uniform way across the
country.  Finally, there are advantages that relate to the staffing of an
efficient tax administration service.  Among these are central organization of
the training programs, the ease of transferability of personnel within a cen-
tralized system, and the greater possibility of promotion and advancement
within a central revenue service.
138.  There are also disadvantages.  If coupled with increased local fiscal
autonomy, there would have to be some local tax administration for local
taxes.  Separate central and local systems would involve duplication of effort
27/  For a discussion of tax administration in China, see Revenue Mobi-
lization and Tax Policy, Red Cover Report, 1990, World Bank.- 45  -
and inevitably a weaker, "second-class" local administration.  Another problem
is that a central revenue system in China would be an enormous bureaucracy,
and inevitably would have to decentralize to accommodate the great diversity
in tax administration needs within the country.  The biggest disadvantage to
centralization is that intimate familiarity with the local economy and its
tax-paying base can be lost.  For example, most central sales and income tax
systems in low income countries do not have a very broad coverage of firms,
whereas locally administered systems seem more able to identify and assess
smaller firms.
139.  Perhaps a better course would be to reform the tax administration to
capture the best features of centralization and decentralization.  A few
principles that might be considered are:  (a)  general procedures for taxpayer
identification, recordkeeping, and assessment should be centralized, and all
related manuals should be centrally prepared and updated; (b)  a major staff
training program should be centrally designed and implemented; (c) a
"statistics of taxation" series should be organized centrally and regularly
produced to help in monitoring the performance of the tax system and the
administrative efforts of each decentralized local unit; (d) assessment,
collection and audit responsibilities should remain at the local level, but
procedures should be established by the Central Government and regulated
through  the provincial level; (e) a computerized tax information  3ystem  should
be developed, and (f) tax sharing is a good scheme to stimulate local tax
effort but the local shares should be the same for all taxes so as not to
encourage different levels of administrative effort for different taxes.
Conclusions
140.  This paper argues that a reformed revenue-sharing system must meet the
center's needs for stabilization and the provinces' needs for revenue and
equalization of expenditure capacity.  It has also argued that equalization
should be based on objectivE indicators of need and that a formula-based grant
system best meets this objective.  A reformed system must also underpin price
and enterprise reforms, and not require major recalibration or adjustments,
because such reforms are taking place.  These  three elements ar3 the
foundations of an improved system of local finance.  The central-local reforms
would be supplemented by local borrowing powers, a system of benefit charges,




Procvclical Effects of Contracting with Provinces
for Revenue Co-wction
1.  The provincial contracting arrangement can be formalized to illus-
trate the type of problems discussed in the text and the factors affecting
revenue elasticity.  The tax remittance/transfer to the center by a province
in year i (PT,,  is
PT;  ab(C)  +  am (C-C;)
ab - provinces' quota contracted sharing rate
am =  marginal, above-quota sharing rate (which may be zero) (am<sOsab)
C*=  provincial quota collections
C;=  actual provincial collections
Assuming that the provinces' transfer to the center is based on some share of
actual taxes collected in the base year (C.,)  (in fact, the post-1985 sharing
ratios are based on 1983/84 base-year actual tax collect:tons  in a province),
then the provincial transfer (PT):
(1)  PT,  =  ab(C.)  +  am(C.-C,)
(2)  C  =  (l+g)C. 1
Since the quota in subsequent years is a function of the previous year's
quota:
e,  =  (l+g)Cn;  and
cl  =  (l+g) (1+g)C. 1)
Then  C,  - C.1(1+g)5+'
If C. (actual  provincial collections) grows at a constant rate (Q),
then:
(3)  C.  = C1(1+Q) 8 +i
If GNP grows at a constant rate (B),  then:
(4)  GNP, = GNP- 1(l+B)"+'
To see the evolution of provinci 1 taxes (PT)  turned over to the central gov-
ernment as a share of GNP (PT/GNI),
substituting,
PT.  =ab[C,(l+g)"+']  +  am{((l+Q)+"C. 1 1  - [C. 1(l+g)pi;)}
GNP 8 (l+b)n+'GNP 1
* {(ab-amj(l+g)"+ +  am(l+Q)n+'}  C.,
l+B…)n+1  (1+B)n+l  GNP.ANNEX.-
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Thus:
(a)  PT/GNP remains constant only if:  g =  B  Q (i.e., if the growth
rate implied in the contract (g) is the same as the rate (B)  of GDP
*ind  the rate of growth of actual provincial collections (Q));  and
(b)  the center's tax/GNP ratio will grow only if:  gaB [i.e., if the
growth rate in the contract (g) is greater than the GDP growth rate
(B)].
Assuming for the time being that GNP and provincial tax collections grow at
the same rate (which  would imply provincial exploitation of the tax base at a
constant rate (so that B-Q)J, the expression simplifies to:
(b)  {(ab-am](1+g) +  am}  C.,
(1+B)  GNP,
Thus:
(a)  PT/GNP remains constant only if g=B, i.e., if the contracted growth
rate in the provincial agreement is equal to GDP growth.
(b)  PT/GNP will fall if g<B, i.e., if the contracted growth rate in the
provincial agreement is less than GDP growth.  In fact, the PT/GNP
falls, exponentially, according to length of the provincial con-
tract.  Note that, if the contracts were set with reference to a
specific growth rate over the actual taxes delivered to the center
each year (i.e.,  ab(C 1.,  - C;)  instead of am(C*  =  C;)]  instead of over-
base-year taxes, this decline in relation to GNP would not occur.
2.  Detailed data on the magnitude of the growth rates specified in
incremental/above-quota tax delivery requirements is incomplete.  In two prov-
inces, Shanghai anc Guangdong, accounting, respectively, for 15 and 6 percent
of total provincial tax collections (1986),  the above-quota growth rate speci-
fied in the contracts were zero (in  Guangdong) and 9 oercent (in Shanghai).
By contrast, Guangdong and Shanghai's provincial GVIA0 and, by implication the
tax base, grew far more rapidly in the 1980-89 period.28/
3.  If, in addition, the provinces' actual tax collection effort also
wanes, say, due to the effects of enterprise negotiation or, simply lax tax
effort on the part of the province, such that collections grow less rapidly
than GNP (i.e.,  Q<B), then the tax received by the center will decline expo-
nentially in a dual fashion, i.e., (a)  due to the impact of a low contracted
growth rates (g<B);  and (b)  due to the fact that the exploitation of the con-
tracted base is growing slower than GNP (Q<B).
28/  This has been adapted from Blejer and Szapary, IMF, 1989, op. cit, who
used their notation and framework to describe the effects of enterprise
tax contracts under the corporate income tax.  The notation and
methodology have been adapted here to analyze provinces' contracting.ANNEX 2
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CHINA
CENTRAL-LOCAL  FISCAL  RELATIONS
gountereoualizing Proxertieg of Provincial Tax Contracting
1.  Using the same notation as Annex 1, we defined provincial expendi-
ture (PE) can be stated as:
PE  =  C;  - (abC  +  am(C1-C)
substituting as before,
PE - C,-(+Q)+-{[abC. 1 (1+g)n'l  +  am (C-,(l+Q)  - C.,(l+g)n+']}  +  L
where L =  fixed lump-sum transfer
!  C. 1(l+Q)f+'  [l+am] - Cab-am]C 1(l+g)"+'  +  L
PE.  x  ((l+Q)"+ 1(l+am)] - ((ab-am)(l+g)n+lj  *  C-,  +  L
GNP.  (1+B)U+l  (1+B  )n+I  GNP  (1+B)D+l
2.  Thus, for a given ccllection rate, Q:  provincial expenditure capa-
city will grow relativa to GNP as the growth in collections (Q)  exceeds the
growth in the contract (g).  For those provinces with-fixed contract delivery
(g=O),  expenditure capacity will grow at the rate of Q.  For those provinces
where g>O, expenditure capacity grows at a rate related to (Q-g).  For a given
collection rate, in those provinces where g=O, but a transfer from the central
government is received, expenditure capacity does not grow relative to GNP
inasmuch as the growth rate in the lump-sum transfer is zero.Table  1: TAX  COLLECTION  AND  EXPENDITURE
Wy  Level  of  Goverrmient,  1980-90
1930  1?81  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990B
Total  revenues  108.5  108.9  112.4  124.9  150.1  186.6  231.0  236.0  262.8  285.9
Central  goverrmnt  21.0  22.5  25.8  37.2  52.4  69.0  91.7  83.3  94.5  107.2
of  which:  borrowing  --  7.3  8.4  8.0  7.7  10.0  13.9  16.9  23.1  22.0
Local goverment  87.5  66.5  86.6  87.7  97.7  117.6  134.3  152.7  168.3  178.7
of  which:  own  11.8  11.6  12.5  15.3  15.9  19.0  --  --  --  --
Total  expenditure  121.2  111.5  115.3  128.4  153.6  186.5  233.0  242.5  263.5  0.0
Central  65.0  60.2  57.5  64.2  72.8  81.9  96.2  95.8  94.6  --
Local  56.2  51.3  57.8  65.8  80.8  104.6  136.8  146.7  168.9  --
Central  collections  deficit  -44.0  -37.7  -31.7  -27.0  -20.4  -12.9  -4.5  -12.5  -0.1  107.2
Funded  by:
Local collections  surplus:  31.3  35.2  28.8  21.9  16.9  13.0  -2.5  6.0  -0.6  178.7
Central  borrowing  --  7.3  8.4  8.0  7.7  10.0  13.9  16.9  23.1  22.0
Total  revenues (adjusted)  108.5  101.7  104.0  116.9  142.4  176.6  212.1  219.1  239.7  263.9
Central  21.0  15.2  17.4  29.2  44.7  59.0  77.8  66.4  71.4  85.2
Local  87.5  86.5  86.6  87.7  97.7  117.6  134.3  152.7  168.3  178.7
(in  percent)
Total  expenditure  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Central  53.63%  53.99X  49.87%  50.002  47.402  43.912  41.292  39.512  35.90%  ERR
Loce;  46.37X  46.01X  50.13X  51.252  52.602  56.09X  58.71X  60.492  64.10X  ERR
Total  revenues  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Central  19.35X  20.66X  22.95f  29.78X  34.91X  36.98X  39.70X  35.30X  35.96X  37.50X
Local  80.652  79.432  77.05%  70.222  65.092  63.022  58.142  64.702  64.042  62.502
Total  revenues (adjusted)
Central  19.352  14.952  16.73%  24.982  31.39X  33.412  36.682  30.312  29.792  32.232
Local  80.652  85.052  83.27X  75.02X  68.61%  66.592  63.322  69.692  70.212  67.722
Reverues/GNP  24.27%  22.812  21.672  21.59X  21.682  21.852  23.772  20.782  18.962  18.17X
Central  4.702  4.712  4.97X  6.432  7.57X  8.08%  9.43X  7.33X  6.82X  6.812
Local  19.572  18.122  16.702  15.162  14.112  13.77%  13.822  13.452  12.142  11.362
Central  adjusted  revenues  4.70X  3.18X  3.362  5.052  6.462  6.912  8.002  5.852  5.15X  5.422
Expenditures/GNP  27.112  23.352  22.232  22.202  22.18X  21.842  23.972  21.35%  19.01%  0.00%
Central  14.542  12.61211.092  11.102  10.512  9.59%  9.90X  8.44Z  6.83%  0.00O
Lcal  12.5"  10.742  11.152  11.382  11.67  12.25X  14.07X  12.92X  12.192  0.002
Memo  Items:
Real revenues  108.5  107.0  110.1  120.4  137.2  156.4  183.8  177.6  180.2  179.5
Central  2'.0  22.1  25.3  35.9  47.9  57.8  73.0  62.7  64.8  67.3
Local  87.5  85.0  84.8  84.6  89.3  98.6  106.8  114.9  115.4  112.2
Real revenue growth
Central  5.252  14.332  41.962  33.522  20.752  26.132 -14.08X  3.41X  3.832  Err
Local  -2.892  -0.18  -0.29X  5.602  10.382  8.39X  7.542  0.462  -2.822  Err
GNP  447.1  477.5  518.6  578.4  692.4  854.0  972.0  1135.7  1385.8  1573.1
Deftator  100.0  101.8  102.1  103.7  109.4  119.3  125.7  132.9  145.8  159.3Table  2a:  SHARING  ARRANGEMENTS  IN 1987  BY TYPE  OF TAX
(in  X)
"Fixed  "Fixed
Tax category  "Shared"  Central"  Local"
Industrial-Co*..ercial  Taxes
1. Product  and VAT-
a. Enterprioes  owned  by four  Ministries  30  70  0
b. Tobacco  products  produced  by centrally  owned enterprises  0  100  0
c.  Other  general  taxes  100  0  0
d.  Product  tax  and VAT on  imported  goods  0  100  0
e.  Refund  of  product  tax  and VAT to  central  goverrment  foreign
trade  company  0  100  0
f.  Refund  of  product  tax  and VAT on export  goods,  to  industrial
enterprises  and  local  foreign  trade  enterprises  100  0  0
2.  Business  Tax
a. Enterprises  owned  by  four  Ministries  30  70  0
b. Railway,  central  tobacco  enterprises,  bank  headquarters  0  100  0
c. Genera  I  business  tax  100  0  0
d.  Self_employed  urban  and  rural  households  in  industry  and
commerce  100  0  0
3. Consolidated  Industrv  and Cofferce  Tax
a. Offshore  OIL  enterprises  0  100  0
b.  Other  enrprises  100  0  0
c.  Imported  products  0  100  0
Other  Taxes
'.SpTeial Adjustment  Tax  0  100  0
5. Collective  Enterprises  Income  Tax  100  0  0
6. Self-Employed  Households  in Industry  and  Commerce  100  0  0
7. Individual  Income  Tax  100  0  0
8.  Individual  Income Adjusted  Tax  100  0  0
9.  Joint  Venture  Income Tax
a. Offshore  oiL  0  100  0
b. All  other  100  0  0
10. Fore%in  Ente  ristr  Inconme  Tax
aOfsore  oL  0  100  0
b. All  other  100  0  0
11.  Urban  Construction  and Maintenance  Tax  0  0  100
12.  Vehicle  Utilization  Tax  100  0  0
13.  Local  Vehicle  Utilization  Tax  0  0  100
14.  House Tax  100  0  0
15.  Slaughter  Tax  100  0  0
16.  Animal  Trading  Tax  (livestock  transactions)  100  0  0
17. Free  Market  Transaction  Tax  100  0  0
18. Natural  Resource  Tax  100  0  0
19. Central  Resource  Tax  0  100  0
20. SOE  Bonus  Tax  100  0  0
21  SOE  Wage  Adjustment  Tax  100  0  0
22. Institutions  Bonus  Tax  100  0  0
23.  Collectives  Bonus  Tax  0  0  100
24. Construction  Tax  100  0  0
25  Special  Fuel  Using  Tax  (crude  oil  burning  tax)  0  100  0
26. Deduction  and  Refund  of Fuel  Tax  100  0  0
27.  Salt  Tax  100  0  0
28. Revenue  from  Penalties  and  Fines
a. Customs  duty  categories  0  100  0
29. Agricutture  Taxes
a. Animal  husbandry  100  0  0
b.  Forestry  and special  products  100  0  0
c. Central  land  occupation  tax  0  100  0
d. Local  land  occupation  tax  0  0  100
30. Income  Tax
a.  SOEs income  tax  100  0  0
b.  SOEs adjustment  tax  100  0  0
c. SOEs  profit  remittance  100  0  0
d. Subsidies  for  planned  losses  100  0  0
31. Contribution  for  Enery  Transportation  Projects
a. Paid  by central  SOEs  0  100  0
b.  Paid  by  local  SoEs  0  100  0
32. Interest  Income  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
33. Earmarked  Revenue  n.a.  n.a.  n.s.
34. Revenue  from  Loan  Repayment  for  Capital  Construction  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
35. Revenue  from  Other  Sources
a.  Other  revenue  from  joTnt  ventures  100  0  0Table 2b: SHARING  ARRANGEMENTS  IN 1988 BY TYPE  OF TAX
(in  X)
"Fixed  "Fixed
Tax category  "Shared"  Central"  Local"
Industria  t-Coa iercial  Taxes
1.  Produt  and  VAT
a.  Entter-p-rises  owrned  by four  Ministries  30  70  0
b.  Tobacco  products  produced by centrally  owned  enterprises  0  100  0
c.  Other  general taxes  100  0  0
d.  Product tax  and VAT  on imported goods  0  100  0
e.  Refund of  product  tax  and VAT  to  central  govermient foreign
trade  company  0  100  0
f.  Refund of  product tax  and VAT  on export  goods, to  industrial
enterprises  end local  foreign  trade  enterprises  100  0  0
2.  Business Tax
a.  EnterprFses owned  by four  Ministries  30  70  0
b.  Rail: a,  central  tobacco enterprises,  bank headquarters  10  0  0
c.  General business  tax  100  0  0
d.  Self-employed urban and rural  households in  industry  and
commerce  100  0  0
3.  Consolidated  Industry  and Commerce  Tax
a.  Offshore  oIl  enterprises  0  100  0
b.  Other  enterprises  100  0  0
c.  Impor
t ed products  0  100  0
Other Taxes
4.  Special  Adjustment Tax  0  100  0
5.  Collective  Enterprises  Income  Tax  100  0  0
6.  Self-Employed Households  in  Industry  and Commerce  100  0  0
7.  Individual  Income  Tax  100  0  0
8.  Individual  Income  Adjusted Tax  100  0  0
9.  Joint  Venture Income  Tax
a.  Offshore  oil  0  100  0
b.  ALl  other  100  0  0
10.  Foreion Enterprise  Income  Tax
aD.  Offshore  oil  0  100  0
b.  All  other  100  0  0
11.  Urban Construction  and Maintenance Tax  0  0  100
12.  Vehicle  Utilization  Tax  100  0  0
13.  Local  Vehicle  Utilization  Tax  0  0  100
14.  House  Tax  100  0  0
15.  Slaughter  Tax  100  0  0
16.  Animal Trading Tax (livestock  transactions)  100  0  0
17.  Free Market Transaction  Tax  100  0  0
18.  Natural  Resource  Tax  100  0  0
19.  Central  Resource  Tax  0  100  0
20.  SOE  Bonus  Tax  100  0  0
21.  SOE  Wage  Adjustment Tax  100  0  0
22. Institutions  Bonus Tax  100  0  0
23.  Collectives  Bonus  Tax  0  0  100
24.  Construction  Tax  100  0  0
25.  Special  FueL  Using Tax (crude  oil  burning  tax)  0  100  0
26.  Deduction and Refund of  Fuel  Tax  100  0  0
27.  Salt  Tax  100  0  0
28.  Revenue  from Penalties  and Fines
a.  Customs  duty  categories  0  100  0
29.  Aariculture  Taxes
aAnima  husbandry  100  0  0
b.  Forestry  and special  products  100  0  0
c.  Central  land occupation  tax  0  100  0
d.  Local  land occupation  tax  0  0  100
30. Income  Tax
a.  SOEs  income tax  100  0  0
b.  SOEs  adjustment tax  100  0  0
c.  SOEs  profit  remittance  100  0  0
d.  Subsidies  for  planned losses  100  0  0
31.  Contribution  for  Energy Transportation  Projects
a.  Paid by central  SOFF  0  100  0
b.  Paid by  local  SOEs  0  100  0
32.  Interest  Income  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
33. Earmarked  Revenue  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
34.  Revenue  from Loan Repayment  for  Capital  Construction  n.e.  n.a.  n.a.
35.  Revenue  from Other  Sources
a.  Other  revenue fraro joint  ventures  100  0  0Table  3:  REVENUE-SHARING  SYSTEM  BETWEEN  THE
CENTRAL  AND LOCAL  GOVERNMENTS,  1985-87  La
Fixed  percentage  Province  retains  Province  retains  own
of total  revenue  all own revenue  and  receives  revenue  and  pays  fixed
reained bv,:rovvnce  fixed  amount  from  the  center  amount  to the  center
Provinces  & regions  1985  1986  1987  1985  1986  1987
--------  t  ........  -------------------  (Yuan  mitlion)  -----------------
North  China
Beijing  48.20  49.55  49.55
Tianjin  39.50,  39.45  39.45
Hebei  6;.00  72.00  72.00
Shanxi  97.50  97.50  97.50
Inner  Mongolia  1,783  1,961  2,059
Northeast  China
Liaoning  51.10  52.66  52.66
Jilin  397  396  396
Heitlongjiang  96.00  142  142
East  China
Shanghai  26.00  23.54  23.54
Jiangsu  39.00  41.00  41.00
Zhejiang  55.00  55.00  60.81
Anhui  80.10  80.10  80.10
Fujian  235  234  234
Jiangxi  239  239  239
Shandong  59.00  77.47  75.00
Central/South  China
Henan  81.00  81.00  87.71
Hubei  66.50  100.00  100.00
Hiunan  88.00  88.00  88.00
Cuangdong  772  778  778
Guangxi  716  788  827
Southwest  China
Sichuan  89.00  100.00  100.00
Guizhou  743  817  858
Yunnan  637  925  972
Tibet  750  825  866
Northwest  China
Shaanxi  270  270  270
Gansu  246  245  245
Qinghai  611  671  705
Ningxia  494  543  57r
Xinjiang  1,450  1.594  1,674
/a  Subsidies  were  to increase  by 10 percent  per year  after  1985.
Source: Data  supplied  by Ministry  of  Finance.Table  4: REVENUE  AND  EXPENDITURE  DISPARITIES  ANOWG  PROVINCES
(1985)
Budgetary  Ranking:
revenue  cotlections  Budoetarv  exoenditures  Percent  Per
Per  capita  Percent  Per capita  Percent  of  total  capita
mount  of  amount  of  popu-  national
(Rlb/person)  total  (Rmb/person)  total  lation  income
BeiJing  609  4.97  344  3.15  0.92  2 Lg
Tianjin  597  4.10  334  2.58  0.78  3 L
Hebei  81  3.84  75  3.98  5.33  14
Shanxi  95  2.12  135  3.40  2.52  12
Inner  Mongolia  72  1.22  170  3.27  1.93  16
Liaoning  231  7.24  154  5.44  3.54  4  L
Heilongjiang  98  2.76  135  4.27  3.18  5  Li
Shanghai  1,492  15.43  346  4.02  1.17  1  La
Jiangsu  135  7.14.  81  4.83  5.97  6 La
Zhejiang  145  4.95  93  3.57  3.87  7  /a
Anhui  58  2.56  66  3.24  4.95  21  Lb
Fujian  92  2.13  113  2.93  2.61  17
Jiangxi  56  1.66  81  2.68  3.32  22  Lb
Shandong  88  5.74  67  4.90  7.39  10  /a
Henan  63  4.16  64  4.73  7.41  25  /b
Hubei  102  4.27  88  4.17  4.74  11
Hunan  70  3.33  71  3.83  5.40  19
Guangdong  112  5.92  107  6.41  6.01  9 La
Guangxi  52  1.71  77  2.84  3.72  28  Li
Sichuan  57  4.99  63  6.13  9.79  26 /b
Guizhou  49  1.23  80  2.28  2.85  29  lb
Yunnan  80  2.33  108  3.51  3.27  27  /b
Tibet  40  0.07  517  0.98  0.19  18
Shaanxi  68  1.72  92  2.63  2.88  24  Li
Gansu  81  1.40  118  2.29  1.96  23 Lb
Qinghai  60  0.20  248  0.96  0.39  15
Ningxia  70  0.25  237  0.94  0.40  20  /b
Xinjiang  62  0.72  210  2.73  1.31  13
Total  100.00
/a Among  10  richest  provinces.
,b Among  10  poorest  provinces.
Source: Data supplied  by MOF.Table  5:  BUDGETARY  EXPENDITURE  BY PROVINCE
(in  bitlion  yuan)
1983  1986  Percent  increase  Per  capita  income  ranking:  1985
BeIjing  19.61  44.27  125  2 L
Tianjin  20.49  34.85  70  3 La
Hebei  2-.27  53.82  90  14
Shanxi  24.01  41.17  71  12
inmer Mongolia  22.83  43.89  92  16
Liaoning  34.17  75.51  120  4  L
Heitongjiang  30.71  61.47  100  5  a
Jiangsu  32.29  66.16  104  6  Lh
Shanghai  19.03  56.95  199  1 /a
Zhejiang  21.94  50.95  132  7  a
Anhui  20.38  46.18  126  21  /b
Shtndong  32.41  67.94  109  10
Henwn  30.06  69.20  130  25 Lb
Hubei  28.32  58.02  104  11
Hunan  25.31  54.29  114  19
Sichuan  36.64  87.74  139  26 Lb
Jilin  19.41  50.12  158  8  a
Jiangxi  17.27  36.63  112  22  /b
Shaanxi  18.81  35.59  89  23  gb
Gansu  15.53  30.01  93  15
FuJiat  17.55  37.62  114  17
Guangxi  18.84  42.22  124  28 Lb
Yunnan  24.03  47.31  97  27  /b
Tibet  5.88  8.97  61  18
Qinghai  7.39  12.22  65  15
Ningxia  6.95  12.02  73  20  Lb
Xinjiang  18.61  35.12  89  13
Guangdong  37.65  89.55  138  9 La
Guizhou  15.55  30.39  95  29  L
Total  649.00  1.380.00  112
Source:  Comuted  from  data  provided  by  Ministry  of  Finance.Table  6:  PERCENT  INCREASE  IN REVENUES  AND EXPENDITURES,
BY PROVINCE  FOR  1983-86
Budgetarv  Expenditures_  Budgetary  Collections  Ranking:
Percent  Retetive  Percent  Relative  Per  capita
Province  increase  (average100)  Rank  Increase  (average=100)  Rank  national  income
(1988)
Beijing  125.75  111.92  8  61.05  127.30  18  2 La
Tianjin  70.08  62.38  27  40.68  84.83  22  3  a
Hebei  90.38  80.44  22  40.62  84.69  23  14
Shanxi  71.47  63.61  26  18.59  38.77  26  12
Inner  Mongolia  92.25  82.10  21  129.18  269.38  2  16
Liaoning  120.98  107.68  10  12.49  26.05  28  4 L
Heilongjiang  100.16  89.15  17  109.07  227.43  5  5  a
Jiangsu  104.89  93.36  15  119.67  249.53  4  5 La
Shanghai  199.26  177.35  1  15.86  33.06  27  1  /a
Zhejiang  132.22  117.68  5  32.40  67.55  24  7 LA
Anhui  126.59  112.67  7  64.18  133.83  15  21 Lb
Shandong  109.63  97.57  14  58.33  121.63  19  ^0
Henan  130.21  115.89  16  135.57  202.70  1  25 /b
Hubef  104.87  93.34  16  77.75  162.14  12  11
Hunan  114.50  101.91  11  21.15  44.10  25  19
Sichuan  139.47  124.13  3  50.71  105.75  20  26  Lb
Jitin  158.22  140.82  2  42.38  88.38  21  8  /a
Jiangxi  112.10  99.77  13  62.79  130.94  16  22  Lb
Shaanxi  89.21  79.40  23  125.74  262.19  3  23 Lb
Gansu  93.24  82.99  20  81.64  170.24  9  15
Fujian  114.36  101.78  12  62.74  130.82  17  17
Guangxi  124.10  110.45  9  88.88  105.33  a  28 Lb
Yurnan  96.88  86.23  18  74.96  156.30  13  27 /b
Tibet  52.55  46.77  29  -85.42  -178.12  29  18
Qinghai  65.36  58.17  28  65.68  136.96  14  15
Ningxia  72.95  64.93  25  81.28  169.50  10  20 /b
Xinjiang  88.72  78.96  24  108.44  226.13  6  13
Guangdong  137.85  122.69  4  105.62  220.24  7  9 /a
Guizhou  95.43  84.94  19  81.17  169.27  11  29 /b
La  Among  10  richest  provinces.
Lb Among  10 poorest  provinces.Table  7:  CHANGES  IN THE  RATIO  OF EXPENDITURES  TO COLLECTIONS:
FOR 1983-86  BY PROVINCE
Ranking:
Ratio  Change  Per capita
Province  1983  1986  1983-86  national  income
(1988)
BeijIng  0.52  0.73  0.21  2  L
TianJin  0.53  0.64  0.11  3  _Q
Hebei  0.78  1.05  0.27  14
Shanxi  0.99  1.44  0.45  12
Inner  Mongolia  3.27  2.74  -0.53  16
Liaoting  0.39  0.76  0.37  5 L
Jilin  1.37  1.70  0.33  a L
Neilonga]ang  1.42  1.29  -0.13  5 L!
Shanghai  0.12  0.32  0.20  1 La
Jiangsu  0.43  0.67  0.24  5  LA
Zhejiang  0.53  0.74  0.21  7  La
Anhui  0.91  1.30  0.39  21  Lb
Fujian  1.42  1.29  -0.13  17
Jiangxi  1.28  1.52  0.24  22 Lb
Shandong  0.63  1.09  0.46  10
Henan  0.82  1.26  0.44  25 L_
Hubei  0.70  1.01  0.31  11
Hunan  0.86  1.14  0.28  19
Guangdong  1.04  1.09  0.05  9/a
Guangxi  1.36  1.67  0.31  28  Lb
Sichuan  0.89  1.30  0.41  26  Lb
Guizhou  1.78  1.85  0.07  29  Lb
Yunnan  1.40  1.58  0.18  27 Lb
Tibet  12.25  128.14  115.89  18
Shaanxi  1.29  1.48  0.19  23  Lb
Gansu  1.42  1.52  0.10  15
4inghaf  4.80  3.81  -0.99  15
Ningxia  3.90  3.28  -0.62  20 Lb
Xinjiang  3.31  3.44  0.13  13Table  8:  OLS REGRESSION  RESULTS  FOR  CHINESE  REVENUES  AND
EXPENDITURES  AGAINST  SELECTED  INDEPENDENT  VARIABLES:
BY PROVINCE  FOR  1985
REGRESSION  COEFFICIENTS  LA
Per capita  Percent  of popu-
Equa-  Logarithms  (L)  output  lation  living  _
tion  Dependent  variable  or Linear  (N)  Constant  (100  RMB)  in  urban  areas Population 12  N
1.  Per  Capita  Revenue  L  -5.049  1.357  0.333  ...  0.91  29
(8.53)  (0.114)  (0.129)
2.  Per Capita  Revenue  L  -5.608  1.391  0.314  0.053  0.91  29
(7.06)  (11.790)  (2.241)  (1.052)
3.  Per  Capita  Expenditures  L  5.433  0.436  0.106  -0.443  0.93  29
(11.38)  (6.154)  (1.362)  (-14.783)
4.  Ratio  of  Expenditures  L  6.739  -0.558  -0.168  -0.308  0.82  29
to  Revenues  Raised  (11.322)  (6.315)  (1.728)  (8.242)
5.  Ratio  of Revenues  to  N  0.059  1.514  (E-05)  0.0002  ...  0.63  29
Total  Output  Value  (6.454)  (5.168)  (0.600)
/  T-statistic  shown  in  parentheses  below  the  regression  coefficient.CHINA
CENTRAL-LOCAL FISCAL RELATIONS
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